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Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog

مقابلة مع اعلام اللواء ٣٢

من المعروف أنّ قوات الحشد الشعبي تنقسم بشكل رئيسي الى ألوية لها أرقام وهي تتبع لهيئة الحشد الشعبي. بالاضافة الى هذه الألوية، قامت العديد من الوحدات الأصغر منذ انشاء الحشد وهي معروفة بالأفواج.، وهذه الأفواج عبارة عن تشكيلات محلية وأصبحت معروفة ب"الحشد العشائري" بشكل غير رسمي. ولكننا نرى في الفترة الأخيرة تنظيم عدة أفواج في المحافظات تحت ألوية جديدة مع تتبيعها لقيادات عمليات الحشد في المحافظات. على سبيل المثال، يكون اللواء ٥٩ واللواء ٧٤ في نينوى عبارة عن أفواج محلية في محافظة نينوى تم تنظيمها وتتبيعها لقيادة عمليات الحشد في محافظة نينوى بقيادة خضير المطروحي.

وفي هذا المنشور نسلط الضوء على اللواء ٣٢ وهو لواء جديد يضم بعض الأفواج في محافظة صلاح الدين ويتبع اللواء لقيادة عمليات الحشد في محافظة صلاح الدين بقيادة الحاج صفاء الساعدي. واليكم المقابلة التي أجريتها مع اعلام اللواء لكي أزودكم بنبذة مختصرة عن اللواء ودوره في الدفاع عن الوطن والحفاظ على الأمن والأمان.

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By أيمن جواد التميمي  |  Sun, April 21, 2024 7:38 PM  |  Permalink

The Consolidation of Local Hashd Units: The Case of Brigade 32 (Interview)

By now, it is well-known that Iraq's Hashd Sha'abi (Popular Mobilisation Forces) are principally organised into various brigades that have ordinal numbers and are officially affiliated with the Hashd Sha'abi Commission. In addition to these brigades, various smaller 'regiments' (Arabic: afwaj) have arisen during the course of the Hashd's existence. Many of these regiments reflect more local formations and have often been informally dubbed 'tribal Hashd.' However, a more recent trend in Hashd Brigade organisation has been to consolidate provincial regiments into brigades and attach them directly to the Hashd provincial operations commands. For example, Brigades 59 and 74 reflect consolidation of Hashd regiments in Ninawa province (Brigade 74 being particular to the Sinjar area) and their attachment to the Ninawa province operations command of the Hashd that is presently headed by Khudayr al-Matruhi who is tied to Brigade 21 (Badr).

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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Sun, April 21, 2024 3:27 PM  |  Permalink

الضربات الإسرائيلية الجديدة على جنوب سوريا: مقابلة

في سياق ضرباتها على إيران رداً على الضربات الإيرانية التي استهدفت إسرائيل ثأراً لقصف القنصلية الإيرانية في دمشق، شنت إسرائي هجوماً جديداً على منطقة ازرع الواقعة في محافظة درعا بجنوب سوريا. مع أنّ هناك الكثير من التعليقات على ما سيجري الآن، يبدو أنّ الجهود الإعلامية في التواصل مع السكان القاطنين في المنطقة المحلية التي وقعت فيها الضربات والتعرف على موقفهم من الأحداث ناقصة. وهذا التقصير مؤسف، إلا أنّه جزء من مشكلة كبيرة في التغطية الإعلامية، فمع المئات من الضربات الإسرائيلية على مر السنين، بالكاد لم يتواصل الإعلام والمحللون مع الناس الذين يعيشون في المناطق التي تعرضت للضربات.

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By أيمن جواد التميمي  |  Fri, April 19, 2024 8:00 PM  |  Permalink

Israel's New Strikes on Southern Syria: A Local Perspective

As part of its strikes in retaliation for Iran's strikes that were in turn retaliation for the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Israel conducted an attack on Syrian territory: specifically the Izraa area in Deraa province in southern Syria. While there is much punditry speculating on what happens next, there seems to have been little effort to reach out to those living in the vicinity of where the strikes took place and get their perspective on what is happening. This is an unfortunate shortcoming, but the problem is part of a wider pattern of deficiency in coverage. With the hundreds of Israeli strikes on Syria over the years, there has been hardly any outreach by media outlets and analysts to those living in the areas where the strikes have taken place.

To try to remedy this deficiency, today I decided to interview someone I know who comes from the town of Ghabagheb in Deraa province, some distance to the north of where the strikes occurred. This perspective, which is well worth highlighting, is reflective of a Syrian citizen supportive of the Syrian government and a Ba'ath Party loyalist. The interview is slightly edited and condensed for clarity.

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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Fri, April 19, 2024 8:00 PM  |  Permalink

The Islamic State vs. al-Qa'ida in Somalia

While following the Islamic State's daily claims of operations can be useful in giving an overview of the group's activities on weekly, monthly and annual bases, there are cases where the group's affiliates have little to say on a daily basis about their activities but are then subsequently revealed to be engaged in operations and/or military campaigns that are retroactively claimed and reported in the weekly Arabic-language al-Naba' newsletter. This is what we see with the Islamic State's 'Somalia province' affiliate, which has not claimed any operations since early February but is in fact engaged in a sustained campaign against al-Qa'ida affiliate Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (al-Shabaab for shorthand) in eastern Somalia. Like other al-Qa'ida affiliates, al-Shabaab is deemed 'apostate' by the Islamic State, not only for rejecting the Islamic State's Caliphate project but also actively fighting against the Islamic State. Indeed, some biographies of Islamic State 'martyrs' I examined as part of my doctoral thesis included members who had been assassinated by al-Shabaab.

The latest report in al-Naba' documents the 'second' phase of the Islamic State Somalia province campaign against al-Shabaab. This phase began on 28 January and ended on 9 April.

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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Fri, April 19, 2024 7:17 PM  |  Permalink

Iran's Strikes on Israel

I am sure many of my readers were up late last night live-tracking the strikes by Iran and its 'axis of resistance' against Israel in retaliation for the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus. The strikes themselves were bigger in scale than might have been expected but were nonetheless calibrated, with Iran considering its response to be sufficient if the response deters future Israeli strikes on Iranian targets.

In light of the unprecedented nature of the strikes on Israel, it is tempting to carry headlines about how the fate of the entire Middle East supposedly hangs on the edge. Yet this sort of talk is very sensationalist. The prospect of an all-out regional war is still far-fetched, simply because neither Israel nor Iran wants it. Ultimately, as Jonathan Spyer has pointed out, the Iranian and 'resistance axis' long-term strategy regarding Israel is not that a major regional war needs to be launched or that nuclear weapons need to be acquired for the purpose of striking and wiping out Israel in one massive blow . Rather, the logic is that Israel is seen as internally weak and fragile (hence the common refrain that Israel is supposedly 'weaker than a spider's web') and thus continual pressure without launching an all-out regional war can eventually induce Israel's collapse. There is no reason to think that this logic has changed. In this context also, Iran's drive to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons manufacturing capability should be seen as motivated by a desire to establish deterrence against disruption of its activities and those of its regional allies.

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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Sun, April 14, 2024  |  Permalink

The Escalation in Islamic State Operations Against the Syrian Democratic Forces

In queries I have received over the years, I have often been asked if an Islamic State attack or set of attacks over a short-time span in Iraq and/or Syria constituted a 'resurgence' for the group. In general, I do not believe that this sort of framing is the right word, because then the following question arises: what exactly does 'resurgence' mean? Does it mean a revival on the path towards recreating the peak of the group's fortunes in the 2014-2015 period when it seized and controlled substantial amounts of territory spanning the Iraq and Syria borders? This is of course ultimately how the Islamic State frames its general insurgent strategy: namely, that through persistence in waging jihad, it can gradually wear down its enemies to the point of inducing a rapid collapse and swift conquest, similar to what happened with the takeover of Mosul and other areas in Iraq and Syria in the summer of 2014.

Yet few would argue that the Islamic State is close to realising such a goal. Rather than speaking of 'resurgence', it is more useful to ask for a given period in Iraq and/or Syria: has there been an escalation in the scale of the Islamic State's insurgent activities? In the case of Syria, in the recent period (in particular since the beginning of this year), there is good evidence for an escalation in the Islamic State's insurgent activities, in the areas spanning those controlled by the Syrian government and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in central, eastern and northeastern Syria, as will be explained below.

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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Fri, April 12, 2024  |  Permalink

Report: al-Quds Day in the Aleppo Area

This year, 5 April was the world "al-Quds Day" ("Jerusalem Day"): an event organised by Iran in the name of supporting the Palestinian cause. Armed factions across the region that are backed by Iran are known to put on displays and events for al-Quds Day. This includes groups within the Local Defence Forces network (LDF) in Syria. The Aleppo region is arguably the epicentre of the LDF and al-Quds Day activity was well in evidence there. Below are some observations on the event in the Aleppo area this year.

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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Mon, April 8, 2024  |  Permalink

The Turkestan Islamic Party's New Call for Jihad Against China

The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), an Uyghur Islamic group that has a Central Asia-based central leadership as well as a Syria branch, has issued a new statement addressed to the people of East Turkestan (the Xinjiang region in western China where the Uyghurs live). The statement denounces some Uyghur oppositionists who have recently accused the TIP of being linked to al-Qa'ida and serving the interest of the Chinese government. The TIP instead portrays itself as equivalent to the 'armed forces' of the Uyghur people, striving for the liberation of East Turkestan through the only viable means: namely, armed force.

The United States' delisting of TIP as a terrorist organisation is portrayed as part of God's cosmic law of "mutual repulsion among the people." This is a reference to Qur'an 2:251, and the idea is that God has conflicting groups of people fight each other in order to keep them in check. Officially, what the United States delisted in 2020 was the "East Turkestan Islamic Movement" (ETIM), but in practice the name of ETIM has been associated with TIP. The delisting was to the considerable irritation of China, so what TIP appears to be saying is that the delisting is part of the Americans and Chinese keeping each other in check, as part of deliverance for the Uyghur people.

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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Sun, April 7, 2024 12:15 PM  |  Permalink

Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the Druze of Jabal al-Summaq

The insurgent faction Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which dominates the areas of northwest Syria outside of Syrian government control, has presently been rocked by the assassination of Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, an Iraq-born leader of the organisation who had been detained by the group's security apparatus on various charges, including 'collaboration' with the Americans, but was subsequently released last month on the basis that the allegations against him were not proven.

While I have no definitive information on these matters, it is my impression that there was something to the allegations that he collaborated with the Americans in that he may well have passed information to them about the whereabouts of some senior members of the al-Qa'ida-loyalist Hurras al-Din, who were then eliminated in American airstrikes. This would not be surprising if it could be proven: after all, Qahtani not only opposed the Islamic State but also came to see al-Qa'ida's brand as a liability for Islamic causes around the world, urging the group's affiliates to abandon al-Qa'ida just as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham had broken ties with al-Qa'ida.

As to why Qahtani was released, it is my impression that there was internal and external pressure on Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's leader Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani to do so, whatever the allegations and the evidence for them against Qahtani. The assassination of Qahtani is officially being portrayed as the work of an Islamic State suicide bomber: plausible if the assassin intended to commit a suicide bombing. But a more targeted method of killing would leave a more open question of the perpetrator, including the possibility of Jowlani eliminating a perceived internal threat from Qahtani and his support base. A truly definitive resolution of this question may never come to light, just as no one knows for sure who, if anyone, was responsible for the killing of many of Salafi insurgent group Ahrar al-Sham's first generation of leaders nearly ten years ago.

All these matters aside, I did want to highlight a less noticed recent development: namely, a small positive change in Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's treatment of the Druze minority in the Jabal al-Summaq area of northern Idlib countryside.

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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Sat, April 6, 2024  |  Permalink

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