The armed conflict in Sudan that began in mid-April between the regular army led by Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Muhammad Hamdan Daqlo (Hamedti) is essentially a power struggle. Whereas the regular army wishes to subsume the RSF, the RSF latter is aiming to maintain an independent or semi-autonomous status.
Whatever their rhetoric, both sides also seek to have influence over any future Sudanese government, undermining the talk of transition to a real civilian-led democracy hoped for by Western powers. With little incentive for a mediated peace agreement, the conflict will likely continue longer than most optimistic observers hope. This outlook in turn bodes ill for an economy that was already struggling as well as prospects for foreign investment.
It is helpful for deeper understanding of the present fighting to have awareness of the historical context. Sudan's history since independence has been primarily characterised by military and Islamist rule, with the most recent phase of this phenomenon being the military dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir (1989-2019). The country has also witnessed multiple ethnic and religious conflicts, the most prominent being the north-south divide that culminated in South Sudan's independence in 2011 and the Darfur conflict in the west of the country beginning in 2003.
During the Darfur conflict the Bashir-led government supported Janjaweed militias that fought rebels in Darfur. These militias became the foundation of the RSF that was constituted as a formal force in 2013. The RSF was recognised in 2017 by parliamentary law as officially affiliated with the armed forces, but on the ground maintained an autonomous status, while Daqlo's own economic and political influence within Sudan grew.
While Bashir had been supported for most of his tenure by both Burhan and Daqlo, both men turned on him in the wave of protests in 2019 that culminated in Bashir's ouster and heralded the potential for a Sudanese transition to civilian-led democracy.
Sudan's history, however, should have made clear that the transition was not going to be an easy process and would likely face disruption. In October 2021 Burhan launched a coup against the transitional government (a coup that was backed at the time by the RSF), reinstating military rule and monopolising power.
Even so, civilian pressure for a transition continued throughout 2022, and in December 2022, an agreement was signed between the military and Sudanese political parties to restart a civilian-led transition process. Yet a follow-up agreement to name a civilian government has been repeatedly delayed. Part of the delay concerns the issue of integrating the RSF into the military as part of a restructuring of the military. The RSF for its part appears to reject the idea of losing its independent status and being integrated into the military. For his part, Hamedti has denounced the 2021 coup as a "mistake" and claimed it would mark a return to the former Bashir regime.
The clashes themselves were immediately triggered by RSF deployments that sparked tensions with the regular military and followed another delay in early April for the cementing of a deal to form a civilian-led government. The RSF accuses the regular army of launching a coup and impeding democracy, while RSF's opponents accuse it of being a rebel militia. There is no doubt that the conflict essentially represents a power struggle in which the RSF wishes at least to maintain its independent status in some way while the regular armed forces seek to subsume it. The commitment of either side to a transition to a fully civilian-led government is questionable at best. Rather both sides wish to maintain influence over a future government even if it is officially civilian-led.
There is little evidence to suggest the conflict is a reflection of an international proxy war: while international actors may have their preferences(e.g. Egypt possibly prefers Burhan and the UAE perhaps prefers the RSF as a perceived anti-Islamist force), these preferences and even claimed support for the RSF by the Russian mercenary Wagner Group are not the main driving force or a significant one in the conflict between the two sides. If anything, the various international actors with interests in Sudan have a preference for stability and an agreement to end the fighting as soon as possible.
Even so, it seems doubtful whether international actors have the necessary leverage to end the conflict. The most likely scenario is that the conflict will be a protracted one, even if the army seemingly has greater manpower and military assets than its RSF rival.
In turn, a protracted conflict is likely to worsen Sudan's economic situation. The economy already saw a significant downturn in the aftermath of the 2021 coup as the Paris Club of creditor countries suspended agreements to restructure its external public debt in June 2022. At the end of 2020, Sudan's debt owed to the Paris Club stood at $23.5 billion. Moreover, earlier this year, the Sudanese pound hit all-time record lows in exchange rates in early 2023.
The oil sector is also at risk. Sudan produces around 60,000 barrels of oil per day while neighbouring South Sudan produces more than twice this number at 125,000 barrels per day, exported via two pipelines running through Sudan. Both converge in Khartoum and most of this oil is exported. While oil production and exportation have not been impacted for now, disruption is likely to come the longer the conflict continues.
Thus, all signs point to the conflict's exacerbation of what was already a dim economic outlook for the country, impacting the lives of civilians who have already seen disruption to everyday services on account of the conflict.