Understandably, the fall of Assad's regime has raised questions about the future of relations between the Sunni Arab and Alawite communities in Syria. Some analysts such as Lina Khatib, drawing on a generally conciliatory tone towards minorities struck by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's leadership as the regime collapsed, have suggested that it is now time to move beyond "Sunni vs Alawite" as a binary for understanding Syria's transitional phase.
I have to say that whatever one's personal sentiments about Assad's downfall, such a suggestion is far too premature. It certainly seems true that once Assad's regime finally collapsed, people across different sects and ethnicities in Syria felt relieved to be finally rid of Assad and the repressive regime, but that does not mean that sect-coded animosity has simply died out overnight. The fact is that the Assad regime was perceived by many Sunni Arabs in the country as embodying an Alawite-dominated regime oppressing the Sunni Arab majority, and the duration of the war, sectarian rhetoric on both sides and war crimes have contributed to an inflaming of tensions since 2011. Of course this does not mean simplistically seeing developments in the country solely in terms of Sunnis vs. Alawites, but it would be naive to imagine that resentment and tension have vanished, especially among individuals over whom the insurgent leadership does not exercise full control.
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