

Understanding Islamism

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and Tom Wilson



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Contents

About the Author	2
Part 1: Does Language Matter? The 'Islamism' Question	5
What is Islamism?	7
Who are the Islamists?	8
Islamists on 'Islamism': An Acceptable Term?	9
Why does all this matter?	12
Part 2: On Islamism	14
Executive Summary	14
On Islamism	15
'Islam' v 'Islamism'	16
Where did Islamism come from?	19
Islamism and Violence	23
Islamism and Muslims	28
Islamism in the West	29
How should we respond to all this?	33
Naming Names	36

Part 1: Does Language Matter? The ‘Islamism’ Question

Dr Martyn Frampton and Tom Wilson

What word should we use to describe those who resort to violence in the name of Islam? This question has recently been the cause of much angst and uncertainty in official circles – and nowhere more so than within the ranks of the British police. In July of this year, reports surfaced that through its Counter Terrorism Advisory Network, the Metropolitan Police had held a consultation on finding an alternative to the term ‘Islamist terrorism’—with Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, the head of national counter terrorism policing, and Chief Superintendent Nik Adams, National Coordinator for Prevent policing, both attending the online meeting.

The suggestion is that this word, encompassing as it does the word ‘Islam’, risks tarnishing one of the world’s great religions – and in the process alienating many British Muslims. Against this are those who argue that Islamism is entirely appropriate, and comes with an established intellectual and cultural pedigree. So, where does the balance of wisdom lie?

Who has opposed using the term Islamist?

A number of individuals, both here and abroad, have criticised the use of the term 'Islamist'. They include

- **The National Association of Muslim Police (NAMP)** was the focus of headlines in July of this year when it emerged that NAMP was urging the police to drop the term 'Islamist terrorism'.¹ Previously, in a 2019 submission to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry on Islamophobia, NAMP had argued that the “problem” with terms like Islamist and Islamism was that they were “intrinsically linked with the word ‘Islam’”, when the “actions and ideologies taken by these so called ‘Islamists’ [were] far from ‘Islamic’”. The danger of using such language, claimed NAMP, was that it reinforced “negative stereotypes given to the wider Muslim community, linking Islam to terrorism”, and thereby fuelling “Islamophobia”.²
- **Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND)**, the controversial activist group – which was identified by former Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Mark Rowley, as a frequent purveyor of extremist narratives centered on an exaggerated sense of victimhood³ – responded to the news about the consultations with NAMP by endorsing the calls for the abandonment of terms like 'Islamism', saying that, “labelling attackers as 'Islamists' or 'Jihadists' works to strain relations between Muslim communities and the police, as opposed to combating future acts of terrorism.”⁴ MEND stated that: “if the police were to follow through on these plans, it would mark an important milestone in undoing the harms that the counter-terror apparatus has inflicted upon Muslim communities.”⁵
- **Cage**, which has often been described as an Islamist advocacy group,⁶ has consistently said that it does not recognize the term Islamist,⁷ and instead describes itself as an organisation with “an Islamic ethos”.⁸ In a March 2018 submission to the House of Commons inquiry into Global Islamist Terrorism, Cage’s Director of Research referred to the “problematic language of ‘Islamist terrorism’”, stating that Cage rejected such terms of reference being used to frame the threat.⁹
- **Max Hill QC**, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, asserted (during his time in the latter role) that it was “fundamentally wrong” to use the phrase “Islamist terrorism” to describe attacks carried out in Britain and elsewhere.¹⁰
- **The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)** published a piece on its website in January 2013, urging the media to drop the term Islamist.¹¹ The CAIR piece claimed that the term Islamist is used as “shorthand for ‘Muslims we don’t like’”, and that the “frequent linkage of the term ‘Islamist’ to violence” is largely “promoted by Islamophobic groups and individuals who seek to launch rhetorical attacks on Islam and Muslims”.¹² Notably, however, CAIR has itself faced accusations of past connections with Islamist extremism.¹³
- **Recep Tayyip Erdogan**, the Turkish president, who in February 2017 argued that this terminology was “not correct because Islam and terror cannot be associated”.¹⁴

1. Dominic Kennedy, 'Police may drop 'Islamist' term when describing terror attacks', The Times, 20.7.2020, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/police-may-drop-term-islamist-when-describing-terror-attacks-7pjsf8pn7>
2. 'Written evidence submission from NAMP (National Association of Muslim Police)', Home Affairs Select Committee, October 2019, <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/islamophobia/written/106456.html>
3. 'Is CAGE a pro-jihadist Islamist organisation?', CAGE, 11.4.2018, <https://www.cage.ngo/faq-items/is-cage-a-pro-jihadist-islamist-organisation>
4. 'Police urged to stop using "Islamist" and "jihadis" to describe attackers', MEND, 4.8.2020, <https://www.mend.org.uk/police-urged-to-stop-using-islamist-and-jihadis-to-describe-attackers/>
5. 'Police urged to stop using "Islamist" and "jihadis" to describe attackers', MEND, 4.8.2020, <https://www.mend.org.uk/police-urged-to-stop-using-islamist-and-jihadis-to-describe-attackers/>
6. Steve Bird, 'Manchester University Press criticised for publishing book linked to Islamist advocacy group', The Telegraph, 4.7.2020, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/07/04/manchester-university-press-criticised-publishing-book-linked/>
7. 'Is CAGE a pro-jihadist Islamist organisation?', CAGE, 11.4.2018, <https://www.cage.ngo/faq-items/is-cage-a-pro-jihadist-islamist-organisation>
8. 'Statement on Telegraph story citing the Government's Commission for Countering Extremism and referencing CAGE', CAGE, 26.9.2020, <https://www.cage.ngo/statement-on-telegraph-story-citing-the-governments-commission-for-countering-extremism-and-referencing-cage>
9. Asim Qureshi, 'Response to the Defence Select Committee's Global Islamist Terrorism Inquiry', CAGE, March 2018, https://www.cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/DefenceSelectCommittee_CAGEresponse_03_2018.pdf
10. Martin Bentham, 'Don't refer to 'Islamist terrorism'', says watchdog, the Evening Standard, 1.2.2018, <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/don-t-refer-to-islamist-terrorism-says-watchdog-a3755701.html>
11. Ibragim Hooper, 'Media Urged to Drop Term 'Islamist' in New Year', CAIR, 2013, https://www.cair.com/op_ed/media-urged-to-drop-term-islamist-in-new-year/
12. Ibid.
13. Andrew McCarthy, 'The Roots of CAIR's Intimidation Campaign', 12.4.2014, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/04/roots-cairs-intimidation-campaign-andrew-mccarthy/>
14. Chris Summers, 'Turkey's president tells Angela Merkel to stop using the expression 'Islamist terrorism' because it 'saddens Muslims'', Mail Online, 2.2.2017, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4185796/Erdogan-tells-Merkel-stop-saying-Islamist-terrorism.html>

Sir John Jenkins' paper—found in the second part of this volume—leaves no doubt as to the academic and intellectual legitimacy of the word 'Islamism'. In what follows we attempt merely to read his insights across into the contemporary British political context.

In so doing, the first thing to note is that the threat posed by Islamist terrorists must be placed within the wider context of 'Islamism' all-told. The 'men of violence' are merely the most visible manifestation of a much larger phenomenon: they are simply the tip of a far greater Islamist 'iceberg'.

What is Islamism?

The subject is replete with a wide variety of often contradictory terms that are frequently used as synonyms: 'conservative', 'traditionalist', 'fundamentalist', 'militant', 'radical', 'modernist', 'reformist', or 'reactionary'. Used in different contexts, the same label can denote very different things. That being the case, it is important to establish precisely what we mean by our use of the term 'Islamism'. Islamism (or 'Political Islam') is a worldview which teaches its adherents that Islam is a comprehensive political ideology and must be treated as such.

Most Islamists believe that Islam must be placed at the centre of an individual's identity, as either the only, or the predominant source of identity. The Islamist outlook is one that essentially divides the world into distinct spheres: primarily, 'Muslims' and 'the rest'. Within the latter category, the 'West' looms large – often understood to be a monolithic entity. Crucially, it is this tendency to view the world in terms of discrete identities that makes accommodation between Islamism and liberal democracy so difficult. The individualism and pluralism that lie at the heart of the latter, run counter to the notion of a wholly self-sufficient, Islamic communal-faith bloc that must be preserved.

Islamists frequently presume Muslims to be members of a de-territorialised, globalised *ummah*, where allegiance is defined through the fraternity of faith alone.¹⁵ Furthermore, they often suggest that Muslims are under constant attack, and it is this perceived perpetual danger that drives the Islamist narrative of victimhood and grievance.

The practical consequences of such an outlook are varied, differing from group to group. It is true that, for the most part, it leads to a belief that *Shari'ah* (Islamic law) should be implemented, either within existing nation-states or in the context of a pan-Islamic theocracy (often referred to as the 'Caliphate'). The absence of a purist Islamic state is judged to be responsible for the current problems of the Muslim world, and only if such an entity is restored, it is argued, will the Muslim world be restored to global pre-eminence. Furthermore, it is equally true that the conception of *Shari'ah* law venerated by such groups typically calls for a return to what is imagined to be a literalist, 'puritanical' and unchanging Islam, based on the earliest generations of Islamic history.

On neither count is this exclusively the case; there is no single 'mode' of Islamist expression. The manner in which different strands of Islamism seeks to achieve their aims is subject to significant variation. Most Islamist movements are not terrorist in nature—although some clearly do support the use of violence in certain contexts (frequently, for instance, as part of 'resistance' to perceived occupation). Equally, non-violent Islamism is represented by individuals and organisations of widely differing hues. So while there are those groups that engage in political activity and wish to gain political power to achieve their aims, there are others that reject such political engagement and instead pursue grassroots community work. For the latter, an Islamic identity is to be promoted from the bottom up, via education and proselytisation, rather than being imposed from the top down, through the application of state power. Both variants, though, are subsumed within the designation of 'Islamism' offered here.

Almost always, Islamists project their view of Islam as the 'true Islam' and pass off disputed theology as uncontested truth. They pretend to constitute the whole of the faith, rather than just a faction within it. Yet it is crucial to distinguish between the two.

15. Olivier Roy, 'Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah' (London, 2006)

Who are the Islamists?

Broadly speaking, Islamist groups currently operating in Britain originate from two major revivalist networks that emerged in the early twentieth century: the Muslim Brotherhood, which started in Egypt; and the Jamaat-e-Islami, whose origins lie in colonial India.

The Muslim Brotherhood is today an international, networked movement with an established presence in most of the Muslim world, as well as parts of Europe and North America. It exists as much in terms of a shared ideology and inter-personal social networks, as it does through coherent organisational structures. There is no Islamist equivalent of the Comintern of yester-year.

The Brotherhood, like other Islamist movements born in the Middle East and South Asia, did not initially conceive a vision for its activist work in the West, believing that its efforts would be primarily focused in the Levant before targeting the wider world for Islamist conversion. That plan changed with the large-scale migration that brought many immigrants of Muslim background to Europe in the second half of the twentieth century. As increasing numbers of Islamists found themselves exiled from the Arab world in the late 1980s, they developed strategies to further their aims within western society. This included the creation of new organisations, designed to cater to new Muslim communities of settlement in Europe and North America.

In the UK, the then European spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood, Kamal el-Helbawy, established the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) in 1997.¹⁶ Numerous academics and commentators have identified the MAB as the de facto British wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁷ ¹⁸ The British Government's authoritative 2015 review into the Muslim Brotherhood, authored by Sir John Jenkins, describes the MAB as having been "dominated" by the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁹

A recent (and several-time) president of the MAB is Anas Altikriti, who has said publicly that he is not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and claimed that there is no formal Muslim Brotherhood organisation in the UK.²⁰ However, Altikriti has also said that in Britain, "the closest there is to the Muslim Brotherhood, and which espouses the basic tenets of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, is the Muslim Association of Britain, which I am a member of".²¹

Beyond the MAB, Altikriti has been involved in the creation of a number of offshoot organisations. Amongst the more prominent have been the now defunct British Muslim Initiative, and the Cordoba Foundation. The latter, founded and led by Altikriti as CEO, was once described by David Cameron as a "political front for the Muslim Brotherhood".²²

It is clear that Brotherhood-inspired groups like the MAB enjoy significant cultural and intellectual influence over Britain's Muslim communities. However, given that the Brotherhood has largely remained an Arab-based movement, its influence in the UK has been achieved by the alliances it has built with Islamist organisations rooted in a South Asian Muslim heritage. Approximately two-thirds of British Muslims have their origins in the Indian subcontinent, making the presence of Islamist movements from South Asia particularly relevant to the lives of the Muslim community here.²³ The most significant Islamist movement to have emerged in the Indian subcontinent is the Jamaat-e-Islami (known as JI), a revivalist group created by Maulana Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979).²⁴

Formally speaking, the Mawdudist network arrived in Britain in 1962, with the establishment of the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), an offshoot of the Jamaat-e-Islami. From the time of its inception, the UKIM styled

16. Mahan Abedin, 'How to Deal with Britain's Muslim Extremists? An Interview with Kamal Helbawy', 8 August 2005. <https://jamestown.org/interview/how-to-deal-with-britains-muslim-extremists-an-interview-with-kamal-helbawy/>

17. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruikshank, 'The Unravelling: the jihadist revolt against Al Qaeda', The New Republic, 11 June 2008.

18. R. Phillips, 'Standing together: the Muslim Association of Britain and the anti-war movement', Race and Class, 50, 2, p. 101.

19. 'Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings', House of Commons, 17.12.2015, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486948/53163_Muslim_Brotherhood_Review_-_PRINT.pdf

20. 'Oral evidence: Political Islam', House of Commons, 7.6.2016, <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/political-islam/oral/34225.html>

21. 'Oral evidence: Political Islam', House of Commons, 7.6.2016, <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/political-islam/oral/34225.html>

22. Andrew Gilligan, 'Terror-link group met in parliament', the Telegraph, 23.11.2013, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10470307/Terror-link-group-met-in-parliament.html>

23. Census, April 2001, Office for National Statistics; Focus on religion (ethnicity) <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cpi/nugget.asp?id=957> accessed on 29/08/08.

24. Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, 'The Islamic Law', The Islamic Law and Constitution, trans. Khurshid Ahmed, (Lahore, 1969), p.140.

itself as an ‘ideological organization’, and sought to play a revivalist and political role in British Muslim life, aiming to educate a ‘vanguard to spearhead a life-long struggle in the cause of Allah’.²⁵ It presides over a countrywide network of thirty-nine branches, over thirty-five mosques, as well as a number of Islamic schools.²⁶

Since the 1960s, there have been a number of other groups founded in Britain, which were also influenced by Mawdudi’s teachings. Of these, the Islamic Foundation (IF) in Leicester is among the most important.²⁷ Established by members of JI to serve as a quasi-autonomous hub for their activities, promoting Islamist ideas throughout the West and providing support for the JI’s global political activism,²⁸ it remains intimately linked to the organisation. For instance, Professor Khurshid Ahmad, a long-time senator and former vice-president of the JI in Pakistan, was one of the co-founders of the IF and served in a number of leadership roles in the organisation.²⁹ ³⁰ Another important early leader of the IF was the now deceased Khurram Murad, also a member of the JI and an important Islamist intellectual in his own right. Khurshid Ahmad, meanwhile, was formerly the rector of the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE) – another institution closely aligned to the ideas of the JI.³¹ ³²

Many of these groups have outgrown their demographic origins and established a presence across the UK’s Muslim communities. Furthermore, the fusion of different brands of Islamism has been achieved through the creation of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), an umbrella group created in 1997 to act as a unifying voice and single point of reference for Islamist activists in the UK. Leading Brotherhood figures like Helbawy were involved in the formation of the MCB. And the British Government’s 2015 Review into the Brotherhood stated that it had “played an important role in establishing and then running the Muslim Council of Britain”.³³

Islamists on ‘Islamism’: An Acceptable Term?

As noted above, many groups and individuals identifiable for their articulation of an Islamist worldview, or pursuit of an Islamist agenda, eschew the term. Often, they self-define simply as ‘Islamic’ – or talk of their involvement in an ‘Islamic Movement’. Sometimes, they even go so far as to claim that using the word Islamist is an Islamophobic act. And yet, on occasion many of those same groups and individuals seem to acknowledge that the term has validity and meaning. To give but a few examples:

- **IkhwanWeb** is the Muslim Brotherhood’s official English language website, with its main office located in London.³⁴ Launched in 2005, the website states that its “main mission is to present the Muslim Brotherhood vision right from the source and rebut misconceptions about the movement in western societies.”³⁵ Importantly, this website routinely uses the terms Islamist and Islamism, both in its own pieces, as well as in the content reproduced from other sources.³⁶ One piece from April 2011 titled: *MB welcomes dialogue with the West without preconditions*, refers to “popular Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, which traces its roots to Islamist ideology born in Egypt,” claiming that the suspicion in western countries towards these movements could in part be attributed to statements from government

25. UK Islamic Mission, ‘Introduction’. Cited in Gilles Kepel, *Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 131.
26. UK Islamic Mission, ‘Introduction’. Cited in Gilles Kepel, *Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 131.
27. A number of Mawdudi’s works are available for purchase from the Islamic Foundation’s online bookshop. Several of these are published by the IF itself: http://sitecreator.siteberry.com/Appdata/build/paltop.asp?GoForFeature=Store&GoForAction=DETAIL&Product_Id=267&W_ID=1&P_ID=3; http://sitecreator.siteberry.com/Appdata/build/paltop.asp?GoForFeature=Store&GoForAction=DETAIL&Product_Id=274&W_ID=1&P_ID=3; http://sitecreator.siteberry.com/Appdata/build/paltop.asp?GoForFeature=Store&GoForAction=SEARCH&W_ID=1&P_ID=3&CurrentPage=2&txtSearch=mawdudi&CAT_SUB_ID=-1.
28. Vali Reza Nasr, ‘The vanguard of the Islamic revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan’ (London, 1994) p.61-62; also see <http://www.jamaat.org/overview/facts.html>
29. <http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/ShowCharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=263371&SubsidiaryNumber=0> accessed on 21/09/08; also see <http://www.senate.gov.pk/ShowMemberDetail.asp?MemberCode=431&CatCode=0&CatName=> accessed on 06/10/08.
30. Gilles Kepel, ‘Allah in the West: Islamic movements in America and Europe’ (Stanford, 1997).
31. The website states that “MIHE represents the latest academic project of the Islamic Foundation”, <http://mihe.org.uk/html/islamicfoundation.htm>
32. Vali Reza Nasr, ‘The vanguard of the Islamic revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan’ (London, 1994) p.61-62.
33. Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings, House of Commons, 17.12.2015, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486948/53163_Muslim_Brotherhood_Review_-_PRINT.pdf
34. Ikhwanweb, ‘About’, <https://www.ikhwanweb.com/about.php>
35. Ikhwanweb, ‘About’, <https://www.ikhwanweb.com/about.php>
36. Ikhwanweb, ‘Islamist Groups’, <https://www.ikhwanweb.com/tagBView.php?id=Islamist%20Groups&start=0>

leaders.³⁷

- **The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)** published a piece on its website in October 2015 defending the Muslim Brotherhood-linked charity Europe Trust.³⁸ In that piece, one academic is referred to as an expert “on Islamist parties in the Middle East”, and is quoted as stating that: “not all Muslims are Islamists and most Islamists are moderates!”³⁹ Here, it appeared that the Muslim Association of Britain accepts the use of the term Islamist, on this occasion as part of an argument claiming that Islamism forms a largely moderate political movement.
- **The Cordoba Foundation** has repeatedly used the term Islamist, both in its publications, and through its website. Most recently, in August 2020, a speaker advertised for an online event on the US elections was described as having written about “the historical experiences of Islamist movements in six different countries”.⁴⁰ Previously, in a summary of the foundation’s September 2015 report *Muslim Brotherhood and the Myth of Violence and Terrorism*, it was claimed that the western media portrayed the Arab Spring in such a way as to create mistrust and suspicion of those who follow “an Islamic or Islamist ideology”.⁴¹ The summary for another Cordoba report published in the same month, *Egypt’s Stolen Democracy*, claimed that the media had seized upon Mohammed Morsi’s “Islamists credentials, and the fact that he brought a brand of ‘Political Islam’ to Egypt.”⁴² Earlier that year, in February 2015, the foundation issued a media release providing an account of its *Islam and Democracy National Conference*, detailing that topics at the conference “ranged from Islamists’ perceptions of democracy, the State, secularism, violence and extremism”.⁴³ Other examples include website articles that refer to “liberal Islamists”, and “moderate Islamists”.⁴⁴ And in February 2009, the CEO of the Cordoba Foundation Anas Altikriti chaired an event titled: ‘The Islamist Revolution and the Role of Resistance’.⁴⁵
- **The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC)** is an organisation ideologically aligned with the Islamic Republic of Iran, some of whose leadership have in the past described themselves as “Islamist revolutionaries”.⁴⁶ Unsurprisingly then, there is much evidence of this group freely using the terms Islamist and Islamism. For example, an account on the IHRC website of an event the group held in May 2019 titled *Political Muslims*, with Sadek Hamid and Tahir Abbas, reports how: “the speakers discussed Islamist movements”, and noted that “Islamism is over 100 year old political project, a reformist religiously-inspired movement that came to resist colonialisms”.⁴⁷ In November 2019, the IHRC published an editorial in its *Long View* journal which observed that “salafization” had “destabilised and undermined liberation movements and Islamist politics from Indonesia to Libya,” and noted the “failure of repressive regimes to open spaces for Islamist politics”.⁴⁸

37. ‘MB welcomes dialogue with the West without preconditions’, Ikhwanweb, 22.4.2011,

<https://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=28442>. For other articles using the term Islamist in an unexceptional way, see also: <https://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30216>; <https://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30216>; <https://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30216>.

38. Andrew Norfolk, ‘The money trail: from student digs to ‘motherhood of Islamism’, 10.7.2015, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-money-trail-from-student-digs-to-motherhood-of-islamism-pjt5qj8g98l>

39. Khalil Charles, ‘British Muslim Charity to Challenge Baseless Times Newspaper Article’, Muslim Association of Britain, 28.10.2015, <https://www.mabonline.net/muslim-charity-to-challenge-times-article/>

40. ‘US 2020 Elections and Prospects of Democracy in the MENA Region’, the Cordoba Foundation, 6.10.2020, <http://thecordobafoundation.com/events/us-2020-elections-and-prospects-of-democracy-in-the-mena-region/>

41. ‘Muslim Brotherhood and the Myth of Violence and Terrorism’, the Cordoba Foundation, 4.9.2015, <http://thecordobafoundation.com/publications/reports/new-report-muslim-brotherhood-and-the-myth-of-violence-and-terrorism/>

42. ‘Egypt’s Stolen Democracy’, the Cordoba Foundation, 4.9.2015, <http://thecordobafoundation.com/publications/reports/new-report-egypt-s-stolen-democracy/>

43. ‘News, Views, and Press’, the Cordoba Foundation, <http://thecordobafoundation.com/?s=islamist>

44. <http://thecordobafoundation.com/news/external-news/mali-totalitarian-vs-liberal-islamists/>

45. ‘The Islamist Revolution and the Role of Resistance’, the Cordoba Foundation, 26.2.2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20110720134217/http://thecordobafoundation.com/attach/tcf_islamistrevo.pdf

46. Andrew Norfolk, ‘Iran ‘propaganda’ group IHRC gets £1.2m from taxpayerbacked charity’, the Times, 10.10.2019, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/iran-propaganda-group-ihrc-gets-1-2m-from-taxpayer-backed-charity-r2lh7jkc9>

47. ‘Event Report: Political Muslims with Tahir Abbas & Sadek Hamid’, the Islamic Human Rights Commission, 13.5.2019, <https://www.ihrc.org.uk/news/22467-event-report-political-muslims-with-tahir-abbas-sadek-hamid/>

48. The Long View – Volume 1 – Issue 4, the Islamic Human Rights Commission, November 2019, <https://www.ihrc.org.uk/the-long-view-publication/vol1-issue4/#1556002768602-f4f33f9a-fe0c>. For other examples in which the group uses the words Islamist or Islamism in a routine, far from disapproving way, see: <https://www.ihrc.org.uk/multimedia/video-multimedia/21365-author-evening-sufis-salafis-and-islamists-with-dr-sadek-hamid-2/>; <https://www.ihrc.org.uk/activities/press-releases/11317-press-release-ihrc-condemns-latest-bangladeshi-war-crimes-tribunal-death-sentence/>; <https://www.ihrc.org.uk/activities/press-releases/7205-press-release-turkey-urged-to-release-islamist-journalist/>; <https://www.ihrc.org.uk/activities/alerts-archive/8907-urgent-alert-tajik-regime-sentences-11-islamists-to-death-jails-a-further-74/>.

- **Muhammad Abdul Bari** is a former Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain, and former chairman of the East London Mosque.⁴⁹ Writing for Al-Jazeera in December 2014, in a piece titled: *The asphyxiated politics of the Muslim world*, Bari warned that the rift between “secularists and Islamists” in certain Muslim countries was having a negative impact on Muslim minorities in the West.⁵⁰ Previously, writing on his website in 2011, Bari had warned that a “noxious ‘anti-Islamist’ narrative is gradually becoming mainstream” in Europe, and claimed that there was a divisive agenda by some in the West to try to categorise Muslims as “liberals, Secularists, Moderates, Sufis, Traditionalists, and Islamists”.⁵¹
- **Azzam Tamimi**, a UK-based author and previously an official of the Muslim Association of Britain,⁵² has routinely used the terms Islamist and Islamism. Perhaps most significantly he does so in his 2001 book titled: *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism*,⁵³ which devotes a chapter to ‘Islamist Obstacles to Democracy’.⁵⁴ Tamimi has often been an advocate for Islamists, both complaining about their plight, and at other times talking optimistically about their future political prospects. Speaking to the Associated Press in October 2018, Tamimi was quoted as saying that “The Muslim Brothers and Islamists were the biggest victims of the foiled Arab spring.”⁵⁵ Previously, in September 2011, Azzam Tamimi was quoted in the New York Times as stating that in the future the political struggle in Middle Eastern countries would be about “who is Islamist and who is more Islamist, rather than about the secularists and the Islamists.”⁵⁶ Significantly, Tamimi has also specifically referred to himself as an Islamist. Writing for Al-Jazeera in 2014, in a piece titled *The quest for democracy in the Arab world is an Islamic cause*, Tamimi referred to events in Algeria in the early 1990s and explicitly stated: “I and many of my fellow Islamists endeavoured at the time to prove to the world that Islamists did not only accept democracy and pledge to respect the results of democratic contests,” but that they were also prepared to share power.⁵⁷
- **Anas Altikriti**, the CEO of the Cordoba Foundation, freely used the terms Islamism and Islamist in written testimony given to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry on Political Islam in 2016. He also went to some lengths to defend and excuse some of those bracketed within this term.⁵⁸ Altikriti thus argued that the kind of violence perpetrated by Hamas was neither exclusive to Hamas, nor was it a result of Hamas’ “Islamist nature”.⁵⁹
- **Tariq Ramadan**, who was previously based at St Antony’s College, Oxford as a Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies, has used the term Islamist as a term of analysis. In his 2013 essay *Beyond Islamism*, for example, Ramadan stated that “the various Islamist parties or organizations must be described accurately: some are non-violent, reformist and legalist; others are literalist and dogmatic, while still others are violent and extremist.”⁶⁰ Ramadan insisted that “the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Ennahda in Tunisia enjoy popular and electoral legitimacy,” and that “all democrats must respect the verdict of the ballot box.”⁶¹ Yet, he also warned that “Islamist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood”, had “not kept pace with world-historical developments”, and that out of a “desire to legitimize their participation in the democratic process”, particularly in the eyes of the West, “Islamists have become a reactionary force

49. ‘Dr Muhammad Abdul Bari MBE’, the East London Mosque, <https://www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/dr-muhammad-abdul-bari-mbe>

50. Muhammad Abdul Bari, ‘The asphyxiated politics of the Muslim world’, Al Jazeera, 31.12.2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/12/31/the-asphyxiated-politics-of-the-muslim-world/>

51. Muhammad Abdul Bari, ‘Islam-Inspired Social Activism: A Vision for the Common Good’, Dr Abdul Bari, 26.7.2011, <https://drabdulbari.com/islam-inspired-social-activism-vision-common-good>

52. Dominic Casciani & Sharif Sakr, ‘The battle for the mosque’, BBC News, 7.2.2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4639074.stm>

53. Azzam Tamimi, ‘Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism’, (Oxford, 2001), <https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195140001.001.0001/acprof-9780195140002>

54. Azzam Tamimi, ‘Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism’, (Oxford, 2001), https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Rachid_Ghannouchi.html?id=RFzvgEACAAJ&redir_esc=y

55. Sarah El Deeb, ‘Missing Saudi writer had big plans for his troubled region’, AP News, 12.10.2018, <https://apnews.com/article/02e2e2d9d4a440df99a8e691d34263db>

56. Anthony Shadid & David Kirkpatrick, ‘Activists in Arab World Vie to Define Islamic State’, the New York Times, 29.9.2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/world/middleeast/arab-debate-pits-islamists-against-themselves.html>

57. Azzam Tamimi, ‘The quest for democracy in the Arab world is an Islamic cause’, Al Jazeera, 7.2.2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/7/the-quest-for-democracy-in-the-arab-world-is-an-islamic-cause/>

58. ‘Written evidence from Dr Anas Altikriti’, the House of Commons, June 2016, <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/political-islam/written/34941.html>

59. ‘Written evidence from Dr Anas Altikriti’, the House of Commons, June 2016, <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/political-islam/written/34941.html>

60. Tariq Ramadan, ‘Beyond Islamism’, Tariq Ramadan, 5.8.2013, <https://tariqramadan.com/english/beyond-islamism/>

61. Ibid.

that, in the name of pragmatism, with one compromise after another, have preserved their religious references while voiding them of their potential for social, economic and cultural liberation.”⁶² Still, Ramadan stressed that this “critique of Islamism is in no way an endorsement of the positions and political programs of its opponents.”⁶³

- **Kamal el-Helbawy**, once a prominent spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, is on record as using the term Islamism when discussing the political situation in Egypt. In an interview from February 2011 with ABC News titled *Muslim Brotherhood would promote Sharia Law*, Helbawy listed “Islamists” as simply being one of a number of political groupings in Egypt, along with liberals and secularists.⁶⁴ ⁶⁵ During the previous decade, Helbawy created the UK-based Centre for the Study of Terrorism – described as an “independent research and consultancy organisation, dedicated to providing unique insights into the global trends in Islamic resurgence, democratisation, terrorism and extremism.”⁶⁶ The Centre briefly published the “Islamism Digest journal”.⁶⁷
- **Rachid al-Ghannouchi**, the Speaker of Tunisia’s parliament and a founder of the Islamist Ennahda Party, was based in London for several decades, before returning to Tunisia in 2011. In a piece published by the Wilson Centre in May 2013 titled *Ghannouchi: Islamists now taking on Islamists*, Ghannouchi himself observed that “some Islamists and Salafis”, including those in his own party, had wanted the Shari’ah included in the Tunisian constitution.⁶⁸ His claim, however, was that “Islamists’ arrival to power does not mean that they will dominate the state”. Rather, Ghannouchi expressed his belief that, “moderate Islamists and moderate secularists can and should work together”.⁶⁹

Why does all this matter?

The question of what to call ‘Islamism’ matters precisely because the proper identification of the phenomenon is the first step towards a meaningful response. And because the challenge posed by Islamism is at a fundamental level an ideological one, the words and concepts used to discuss it take on particular significance.

Furthermore, the UK is now at a crossroads in the evolution of its response to Islamism. For the last two decades, the ‘Prevent’ strategy has constituted (at least in theory) the core of the Government’s effort to counter the ideology of Islamism. Yet that strategy is about to undergo an independent review, as mandated by the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. The purpose of that review is to assess how effectively Prevent is delivering on its stated aims, which first and foremost means tackling “the causes of radicalisation” and responding to “the ideological challenge of terrorism”.⁷⁰

Confronting hostile ideologies has long been recognised as an integral element of the national effort to combat violent extremism. The updated CONTEST Strategy, released in 2009, had placed a greater focus on Islamist ideology than had been the case previously, and acknowledged the significance of “perceived and alleged grievances” as drivers of extremism.⁷¹ Discussing Islamist ideology in detail, that incarnation of the CONTEST Strategy had specifically referenced the importance of the writings of figures such as Sayyid Qutb and Abul A’la Mawdudi, in driving the wave of extremism being witnessed at the time.⁷²

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. ‘Muslim Brotherhood would promote Sharia Law’, ABC News, 10.2.2011, <https://www.abc.net.au/lateline/muslim-brotherhood-would-promote-sharia-law/1938630>

65. Ibid.

66. ‘The Islamist Road to Terrorism’, the East London Mosque, 20.10.2007, <https://www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=18cfd77-6834-492d-97da-7321d8cf27b0>

67. Lorenzo Vidino, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood in the West: Evolution and Western Policies’, ICSR, February 2011, <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/1300106834ICSRTheNewMBintheWest.pdf>

68. ‘Ghannouchi: Islamists now taking on Islamists’, the Wilson Centre, 30.5.2013, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/ghannouchi-islamists-now-taking-islamists>

69. Ibid.

70. ‘Independent review of Prevent: terms of reference’, the Home Office, 20.12.2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-prevent-terms-of-reference/independent-review-of-prevent-terms-of-reference>

71. ‘Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’, HM Government, March 2009, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228644/7547.pdf

72. Ibid.

In this way, the UK’s Prevent programme, like the national Counter Extremism Strategy, has long featured specific mention of both Islamist terrorism and extremism. It is virtually impossible to envisage how either of these policies could hope to function successfully without the accurate terminology or conceptual framework concerning Islamism. It is equally difficult to imagine how the Prevent review could be properly conducted if terms as fundamental as Islamist terrorism, or Islamist extremism, were put out of use.

The last time Prevent was subject to an independent review, in 2011, the then reviewer noted that previously, the scheme had been fundamentally flawed by its failure “to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face”.⁷³ What this meant, was an explicit identification of and commitment to challenge Islamism. These important insights later informed the thinking which underpinned the statutory Prevent duty, which was introduced under the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

The parallel Counter Extremism Strategy of 2015 likewise placed great emphasis on understanding the nature and appeal of extremist ideologies—and particularly Islamist ideology—as a crucial step in successfully countering extremism.⁷⁴ Yet across the public sector, parts of Government, and wider civil society—it is this proper understanding of Islamist ideology that has very often been lacking. And despite the lessons learned from the 2011 Prevent review and since, we risk coming full circle, with social scientists and anti-Prevent activists leading the call to de-emphasise the role of ideology, and to instead refocus prevention work around subjects such as mental health, issues of social isolation, and factors such as domestic violence.⁷⁵ A revamped Prevent programme should resist this campaign, and instead ensure that countering the dynamics of ideology, and particularly Islamist ideology, is a core part of counter-radicalisation efforts.

In this context, it is more important than ever that language has meaning and clarity. We cannot counter Islamism, if we cannot identify it; and we cannot identify it if we lack the terms by which to understand it. Ideas matter – and so do words. In ‘Islamism’, we have a legitimate conceptual tool for understanding the most serious ideological challenge faced by the country today. It is time to reaffirm its validity and proceed with the much more serious business of developing our response.

73. ‘Prevent Strategy’, HM Government, June 2011, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

74. ‘Counter-Extremism Strategy’, the Home Office, October 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy>

75. Joan Smith, ‘Home-Grown: how domestic violence turns men into terrorists’, (London, 2019), https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Home_Grown.html?id=4hwftwEACAAJ&redir_esc=y

Part 2: On Islamism

Sir John Jenkins

Executive Summary

- The starting point for this paper is the debate currently being conducted in certain policy circles, including among senior Metropolitan Police officers in Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15), about whether the terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” are appropriate as official descriptors of certain acts, activities or tendencies, particularly those that give rise to national security concerns.
- A decision on this terminology could affect, for example, how terrorist attacks such as the 7/7 bombings in London or the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing are described by ministers, police and security officials, both in public and behind closed doors, in speeches, policy discussions and official documents.
- These criminal acts, it has been suggested, could instead be described as “faith-based violence”, with the true and often declared motives of the attackers – Islamist suicide bombers in the two examples given above – obscured and artificially left open to question, in an attempt to preserve what the proponents of this approach see as community cohesion and social peace.
- In contrast, this paper argues powerfully, based on a wide-ranging analysis of the relevant history and literature, that the terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” are not just appropriate but absolutely necessary and should continue to be used with due regard for accuracy by the UK Government, police and officials in all Government departments and agencies.
- The terms, it concludes, far from stigmatising a particular community actually serve to articulate a fundamental and crucially important distinction between Islam as a remarkable civilisational enterprise, lived faith, moral compass and code of ethics, and Islamism as an activist, socially divisive and supremacist ideology, which seeks to reorder individual lives, societies and states on the basis of a particular and selective interpretation of revelation and in accordance with what it understands as “the divine will”.
- This distinction—between Islam and Islamism—is clearly brought out in the work of numerous distinguished Muslim scholars such as Bassam Tibi, Aziz al-Azmeh and the late Shahab Ahmed, as well as a multitude of western scholars. It is reflected in the intense polemics within the Islamic world between those whom the equally distinguished scholar Nelly Lahoud has characterised as “Islamists”, “Apologists” and “Intellectuals”, polemics whose often violent consequences over the last century have been documented in detail among other by the Lebanese writer and politician Georges Corm and the late Fouad Ajami.
- In seeking to transcend politics through the power of a historically-situated but a-historically interpreted divine revelation, the paper argues, Islamists subject the present and the future to the tyranny of the past and typically place little emphasis on the fundamental principles of tolerance, choice and individual freedoms on which the contemporary liberal order in the West is based.
- Ultimately, for Islamism, it is the interpretation of Shari’ah that sets the limits of liberty. Although some Islamists accept the need to engage tactically in procedural democracy, Islamists by definition do not regard secular electoral choice as the fundamental expression of a legitimate political community.
- Furthermore, Islamism rejects what we consider to be the self-evident legal equality of individuals regardless of gender or religion. As an ideology, it is constitutively illiberal; its approach to education

and societal cohesion is unlikely to promote inclusivity; it seeks power first; and (as we have seen in Sudan since 1983, Iran since 1979 and Egypt in 2012 and 2013) its understanding of how to run modern states without oppression and in the interests of the citizen body as a whole is fatally flawed.

- Above all, the paper argues, the UK Government must recognise that to challenge the phenomenon of Islamism it is essential to be able to identify and name it.
- The British Government must not cede ground to Islamists, who for decades have misleadingly claimed to be the representatives of true Islam, by failing to understand their motives, the roots of their ideology and the consequences of the social and political gains they seek to make.

On Islamism

There has been much comment recently about a debate⁷⁶ within certain official circles in the UK about the appropriate terminology to be adopted when describing, reporting or commenting on acts of extremist violence committed in the name of Islam. Senior officers within the Metropolitan Police Force in particular seem exercised over this issue. It has reportedly been argued that the use of terms such as ‘Islamism’ or ‘Islamist’ is prejudicial to Muslims and damaging to social cohesion on the grounds that what Islamists believe and do is un-Islamic. Critics of the use of these terms wish instead to use some such term as ‘faith-based violence’ or ‘irhabi’ (the generic modern Arabic word for ‘terrorist’), which does not name the religion and, they claim, would be more palatable for Muslims. The Deputy Commander of CT in the MPC, Nik Adams, has been quoted as welcoming the debate and promising to listen to the ‘community’.

Why is this such a contentious issue and what should we make of it?⁷⁷

In truth, the contemporary imbroglia is merely the latest salvo in a long-running dispute on this issue, which has traversed the boundaries of popular commentary and academic scholarship. At the heart of this dispute sits a distinct socio-political movement – or series of movements – which clothes itself in the language of religion. Its adherents proudly insist that their actions, up to and including those of a violent nature, are Islamic. In response, many have argued that such claims should not be taken at face value. To do so, it is claimed, is both to besmirch one of the world’s great religions and to afford undue recognition and legitimacy to those who do not deserve it. Against this are those who insist on taking such individuals at their word and trying to capture the ideological essence of their project in language.

Where, then, does the balance of wisdom lie? In what follows I hope to explain why the term Islamism should not, and cannot, be avoided.

76. Which has its roots in a wider and older argument that the use of any language identifying the faith-based roots of Islamist extremism or violence should be avoided in the interests of community cohesion. This is not simply an issue in the UK. It has been a prominent feature of the German debate on recording anti-Semitic hate crime in Berlin and elsewhere and is a live issue in Austria: see for example *Nehammer: Islamistisch motivierter Täter, Bundesministerium Inneres, 24 August 2020* at <https://bmi.gv.at/news.aspx?id=55595548783575464A6E453D>; *Laut Nehammer islamistisches Motiv, ORF 24 August 2020* at <https://orf.at/stories/3178632/> and the Twitter exchange on the subject at <https://twitter.com/Clarissimata/status/1297253428511543298>. For more perspective see *Ben Cohen, German Government and Police Criticized Again for Downplaying Islamist Involvement in Antisemitic Offenses, The Allgemeiner, 15 May 2019* at <https://www.algemeiner.com/2019/05/15/german-government-and-police-criticized-again-for-downplaying-islamist-involvement-in-antisemitic-offenses/>; *Cnaan Liphshiz, Germany is accused of downplaying anti-Semitic attacks by Muslims, The Times of Israel, 15 June 2019* at <https://www.timesofisrael.com/germany-is-accused-of-downplaying-anti-semitic-attacks-by-muslims/> and *James Angelos, The New German Antisemitism, The New York Times, 21 May 2019* at <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/magazine/anti-semitism-germany.html>. For the wider question in Germany of how this issue should be discussed, the work of Ahmad Mansour, the Berlin-based psychologist of Israeli-Arab extraction, is important. See for example *Psychologe Mansour über Islamdebatte, “Die Mitte schweigt”, Deutschlandfunk, 22 June 2020* at https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/psychologe-mansour-ueber-islamdebatte-die-mitte-schweigt.886.de.html?dram:article_id=478975. He has written and commented more widely on the whole debate. For a French analogy see for example *Gilles Kepel, The new jihad and its mentors, Al Qantara, 24 December 2019* at <https://en.qantara.de/node/38423>.

77. The comprehensive recent French Sénat *Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête sur les réponses apportées par les autorités publiques au développement de la radicalisation islamiste et les moyens de la combattre* at <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r19-595-1/r19-595-11.pdf> is worth consulting on this entire subject not least for its highly operational policy focus. The same applies to the three excellent reports written between 2016 and 2018 by *Hakim El Karoui, Un Islam français est possible, Institut Montaigne, September 2016* at <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/publications/un-islam-francais-est-possible>; *Nouveau monde arabe, nouvelle “politique arabe” pour la France, Institut Montaigne, August 2017* at <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/publications/nouveau-monde-arabe-nouvelle-politique-arabe-pour-la-france> and especially *La fabrique de l’islamisme, Institut Montaigne September 2018* at <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/publications/la-fabrique-de-l-islamisme>.

'Islam' v 'Islamism'

It is important first to understand how the term 'Islamism' arose and why it has become so widespread in the scholarly literature and among commentators and professionals. It superseded a number of earlier terms in broadly the same semantic field, including 'Islamic Revivalism', 'Islamic Fundamentalism' and 'Political Islam'.⁷⁸ All have been attempts to describe the same phenomenon, namely the highly selective deployment of canonical and non-canonical Islamic texts, together with a bricolage of Islamic jurisprudence and history, in the service of an activist socio-political ideology. That ideology seeks to reorder contemporary individual lives, societies and states in accordance with what it understands as the divine will.⁷⁹

It is true that this ideology can sometimes seem no more than an extension of mainstream Islamic beliefs and doctrines.⁸⁰ And many Islamists claim that what they do is simply Islam – properly understood. But there is a profound if subtle distinction, exhaustively documented in the literature on the subject.⁸¹

Islam contains multitudes. It is a religious faith; a code of ethics; a capacious, complex and diverse cultural system; an often contradictory discursive tradition; a global community of believers; a discoverable history; a 1400-year old corpus of subtle, sophisticated, and usually pragmatic textual, jurisprudential and credal exegesis and political philosophy; a set of human experiences and practices from mysticism through puritanism to libertinism and all stations in between; and a civilisational project.⁸²

78. Perhaps the dominant term from the mid-1970s until the late 1980s. *Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, OUP 1993* – originally published in 1969, but based on research that started in the early 1950s – is the classic (and earliest) account of the dominant Islamist movement of the C20th. He uses various terms to describe the MB's ideology, including "revivalist" and "modernist". The contributors to *Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Byron Haines and Alison Findly (eds), The Islamic Impact, Syracuse University Press 1984* use "revivalist" but also "fundamentalist" and indeed "neo-totalitarian". "Political Islam" became more fashionable in the 1980s. *Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity, Ithaca Press 1994*, for example, uses the term, but also explores in various ways the semantics of "revivalism", "reformism" and above all "modernism". In response to the arguments advanced in various works by the Syrian-German scholar, *Bassam Tibi* (who uses both "Political Islam" and "Islamism"), he also discusses the difference between Islam and Islamism. *Karoui 2018* uses 'islamisme' throughout (as opposed to 'fondamentalisme' in the 2016 report, which is less directly concerned with the ideology). Most recently, for example, *Ruud Koopmans, Das verfallene Haus des Islams, Munich 2020* consistently uses "Islamischer Fundamentalismus". But the Center for Global Policy generally uses Islamist/Islamism (and specifically recommends this as a term to avoid confusion with "Islam" in "Islamic" v "Islamist", 29 August 2017 at <https://cgpolicy.org/multimedia/islamic-vs-islamist-in-the-fight-against-terror/>). And the distinguished French scholars, *Gilles Kepel* and *Olivier Roy*, like Tibi, use both "Political Islam" and "Islamism" in their writings from the 1990s onwards – and indeed "post-Islamism" (a term popularised by the US-Iranian scholar, *Asef Bayat*) or "neo-fundamentalism". "Intégrisme" is another term often used in French. Since then "Islamism" seems to have become on balance the preferred term. There is a short but useful early discussion of the genealogy of some of these terminological matters by *Xavier Ternisien, Intégrisme, fondamentalisme and fanatisme, Le Monde, 8 October 2001* at https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2001/10/08/integrisme-fondamentalisme-et-fanatisme-la-guerre-des-mots_229565_3210.html.
79. On the whole definitional debate see *Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism, IB Tauris 2003, Chapter 1. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Shariaization of Malay-Muslim Identity in Contemporary Malaysia MBRAS, December 2018, Vol 91, Part 2, Number 315, 49–78* at https://www.academia.edu/41117522/Shariaization_of_Malay-Muslim_Identity_in_Contemporary_Malaysia_JMBRAS_vol_91_part_2_no_315_2018_pp_49-78 writes: "Islamists' here denotes ideologically-oriented activist Muslims who prioritize Islam's political role and display tendencies to steer Malaysia towards the direction of becoming an Islamic state—an entity whose theoretical underpinning is constructed around the goal of full-fledged implementation of shari'ah (Islamic law) within its national boundaries. In a nutshell, Islamists are Muslim thinkers and activists who espouse 'Islamism'—a political ideology which demands that true Muslims seek to establish a juridical Islamic state governed by the shari'ah in order to realize the ideals of Islam as a comprehensive way of life (din al-hayah)." *Aaron Zelin, From the Archduke to the Caliph: the Islamist Evolution that led to the Islamic State, in The First World War and its Aftermath, T G Fraser (ed), Gingko Library 2015* at https://www.academia.edu/19349433/From_the_Archduke_to_the_Caliph_the_Islamist_evolution_that_led_to_The_Islamic_State quotes the similar definition of all Islamisms by the US scholar, *Peter Mandaville*: "forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of the Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and legal system derive directly from the shari'a." It has also been described by *Guilain Denoëux* as "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations that pursue political objectives ... provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from Islamic tradition." *Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam; The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia, Cambridge MA/London 2011, 281* writes: "The term 'Islamist' is used in a relatively broad sense to designate any formally or informally organized agent acting or wishing to act on his social and/or political environment with the purpose of bringing it into conformity with an ideal based on a particular interpretation of the dictates of Islam." And *Nelly Lahoud, Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries, Routledge 2005, 2* defines Islamism as, "... the term currently used to identify a complex of political currents that understand Islam as a political ideology; an Islamist being an adherent of currents. A common characteristic of such; Islamism is a selective and literal approach to the foundation texts, Qur'an and Hadith, that is, selecting Qur'anic verses and Hadith reports without due sensitivity to context or alternative interpretations, but whose literal sense is conducive to their political objectives. Also common among Islamists is the objective to bring about an Islamic state, which has the shari'a as its constitution."
80. See *Mustafa Akyol, How Islamists are Ruining Islam, The Hudson Institute, 12 June, 2020*, "However, it is not that easy to neatly separate Islamism from mainstream Sunni or Shia Islam. Islamists—parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt—may be further politicizing the religion, and terrorist groups are adding a perverse element of wanton violence. However, what they are all championing is none other than the Shari'ah, the legal tradition of Islam, whose mainstream interpretations are full of commandments that are hard to accept from a modern point of view. Examples would include the execution of apostates and blasphemers, stoning of adulterers, amputating the hands of thieves, public lashings for all kinds of sins, dress codes imposed on females, supremacy of men over women, supremacy of Muslims over non-Muslims, and the overall idea of a closed society that is not just inspired by religion but also policed by it."
81. *Milo Comerford and Rachel Bryson, Struggle Over Scripture: Charting the Rift Between Islamist Extremism and Mainstream Islam (The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2017)* at https://institute.global/sites/default/files/inline-files/TBI_Struggle-over-Scripture_0.pdf is an accessible introduction, illustrating with a wealth of innovative data the different reference points and methodologies of Islamist and mainstream Islamic scholars. *Jonathan Brown, Misquoting Muhammad, One World Kindle Edition, 2014* is a more extensive and historical account. For an interesting earlier scholarly discussion of one potentially murderous aspect of these differences – the question of apostasy from Islam – see *Rudolph Peters and Gert J. J. De Vries, Apostasy in Islam, Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 17, Issue 1/4 (1976 - 1977), pp. 1-25* at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1570336>.
82. This historically polymorphous diversity of Islam is interestingly reflected in different ways in contemporary expressions of the faith, as *Karoui 2016* explains, "L'Islam en France est fragmenté et divers: il n'y a pas un islam mais des islams, nourris et diffusés par des institutions et des mouvements nationaux, des organisations transnationales ou des États étrangers. Cette multiplicité d'acteurs dans le champ musulman français, les tensions qu'ils suscitent et les rivalités qu'ils nourrissent, contribuent à la complexité de la compréhension de l'islam en France."

Islamism – in all its manifestations⁸³ – is a distinctively modernist,⁸⁴ politically purposeful and revolutionary ideology and social movement. It is dehistoricised, decontextualised and deculturated.⁸⁵

This distinction – between Islam and Islamism – is clearly brought out in the work of distinguished Muslim scholars such as Aziz al-Azmeh and the late Shahab Ahmed. They differentiate between, on the one hand ‘lived’, and on the other, ‘textual’ or ‘utopian’ Islam.⁸⁶

Students of the phenomenon have adopted the term ‘Islamism’ precisely because they recognise it as both arising from, making sense within but separate from ‘Islam’.⁸⁷ Moreover, it has come to be seen as a specifically problematic, socially disruptive and often threatening ideological current (for various reasons, some good, some not) – not simply by governments and publics in the West but also by many and perhaps a majority of

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83. As **Karaoui 2018** remarks: “L'emploi du pluriel est, dans un premier temps, requis: nous considérons ici tous les islamismes. Ils forment un ensemble qui, au-delà de la croyance religieuse et de la spiritualité personnelle, porte une interprétation du monde, une vision de l'organisation de la société - y compris le monde profane - et un rôle donné à la religion dans l'exercice du pouvoir. En ce triple sens (interprétation du monde, organisation sociale, relation au pouvoir), il s'agit d'une véritable idéologie politique contemporaine.” I use the singular simply for convenience.
84. Promoting a version of modernity in opposition to that of the allegedly hegemonic West: see the rich discussion of this in relationship to the revival of the Islamic veil by **Nilüfer Göle, The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling, Ann Arbor 2011**. **Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, OUP 2001, 7ff** is also very helpful on the issue of the “integrative revolution” (Clifford Geertz’s phrase) that represents the modernist challenge in many post-colonial states and has a particular valency for Muslim communities.
85. On these descriptors see the discussions in **Bassam Tibi, Islam's Predicament with Modernity, Routledge 2009** and **Islamism and Islam, Yale 2012, Salvatore op cit, Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad, Militancy, Morality, Modernity, London 2005** and **Lahoud 2005**. Many Islamists reject much traditional Islamic jurisprudence, theology and exegesis on the grounds that they reflect the squabbles of different schools or the casuistry of scholastic reasoning. As **Olivier Roy, Holy Ignorance, OUP 2010, 191** remarks, “fundamentalism can also be the expression of modernity through deculturation”. One consequence is that the MB, its analogues and successors, following the example of the puritanical reform movements (the *ahl-e-hadith*) that originated in India in the C19th, also in reaction against colonialism, reject much of the historical jurisprudential and theological corpus as dry-as-dust scholasticism, *Azhari kalamism*, over-tolerant *Murji'ism*, *Maturidism* or speculative, metaphysical and therefore illegitimate *Ash'arism* (for these terms see the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* sv: **John Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, OUP 2013, Chapter 1** (on the Shari'ah); **Joas Wagemakers, Salafism, New Oxford Encyclopedia of Religions, 2016** and **Frank Griffel, What Do We Mean by “Salafi”? Connecting Muhammad Abduh with Egypt's Nur Party in Islam's Contemporary Intellectual History, Die Welt des Islams 55, 2015, 186-220** at https://brill.com/view/journals/wdi/55/2/article-p186_2.xml).
86. See **Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, Verso, London 2009** and **L'obscurantisme postmoderne et la question musulmane, Arles, 2004**; and **Shahab Ahmed, What is Islam? Princeton 2016**. **Sayyid Qutb's Fi Dhilal al Qur'an (In the Shadows of the Qur'an)** is an example *avant la lettre* of what the American cultural theorist Fredric Jameson would subsequently call, in relation to postmodernism, “depthlessness”, a historically shallow but intense textualism that treats the past as phenomenology, a mirror of the present, and comes close to the condition of autoethnography in its insistent solipsism and rejection of critical historiography in favour of a privileging of personal engagement through suffering as the hermeneutic key to the sacred text. See **Aref Ali Nayed, The Radical Hermeneutics of Sayyid Qutb, Islamic Studies, Vol 31, No 3, Autumn 1992** at <http://www.e-bookspdf.org/download/sayyid-qutb-books-arabic.html> and **Jonathan Brown, Misquoting Muhammad, One World Kindle Edition, 2014, 2721ff**: “Where classical Qur'anic commentaries were scholastic and concatenated, weighed down by dry grammatical analysis, occasions of revelation and scholarly opinions, In The Shade of the Qur'an was an intimate plunge into the holy book, fluid and experiential. It was an inhalation of the Qur'an's ethos of radical monotheism and a revolutionary critique of the modern world order.....”. This was revolution as inner reflection. Qutb's later intellectually explosive primer for the Islamist revolution, **Ma'alim fil Tariq (Milestones)**, as **Brown 2014** goes on to say, became the political catalyst for Islamist violence: “The reverberations of Qutb's thought in the ideologies of jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda are palpable”. See also **Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb, Kindle Edition London 2006**.
87. The connection between Islam and Islamism is complex and historically inflected. The socio-political context within which Islam emerged and developed (on which see for example **Jonathan Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the New East, 600-1800, CUP 2003**) made it a very different sort of religion to Christianity and indeed to Rabbinical Judaism. It is hard to speak of a single Islamic orthodoxy: instead, there are endlessly competing and evolving orthodoxies. Islam certainly has a set of distinctive rules of conduct, in its totality named Shari'ah, the principles of which the faithful believe were communicated by God to the Prophet Muhammad and recorded in a small number of canonical source texts. While remaining largely silent on issues of statecraft, Shari'ah determined matters of right worship and right behaviour within an Islamic community (classically divided into ‘*ibadat/worship*’ and ‘*mu'amalat (transactions)*’). The discovery and application of these rules in individual cases became and remains the preserve of a highly status-conscious interpretive class: see **Patricia Crone, God's Rule: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought, Columbia 2004, 8ff**: “The key question to which the law provided answers was how far doing something would assist or impede the journey to salvation, not whether it was allowed or forbidden in the here and now. Assessing the moral status of human acts was the work of the jurists (*fuqaha*). They classified human acts as either forbidden or permitted and, within the latter category, as disapproved, indifferent, commendable or obligatory, trying to work out God's view of them on the basis of the Qur'an and statements by the Prophet, plus some subsidiary sources it was to God and his Prophet, as represented in the here and now by the jurists that the law owed its authority, not to the rulers.” Also see **Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, The Islamic Texts Society, 2003** and **Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, OUP 1964**. And their enforcement is the responsibility of the community as a whole (**Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World, Routledge 1991, Chapter 2**). This is done in the interests of a public morality that both expresses and confirms the ‘*Muslimness*’ of that community. This requires in turn a set of procedural and jurisprudential as well as moral rules for the community and the ability to compel their acceptance. That means that the community of the faithful is also a political community in the sense that it acknowledges the need for a religiously legitimate ruler with a monopoly of lawful coercive power. This can be seen in the foundational document of the first Islamic community of which we have a record, that established by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina sometime around 622AD (that is, a year or so after the *hijrah* from Mecca). This document is generally known in English as *The Constitution of Medina*. It is first recorded in **Ibn Hisham's Kitab Sirat Rasul Allah ('The Life of the Prophet of God')**, a C9th AD recension of a lost C8th original by Ibn Ishaq. It is known under various titles in Arabic: (ةنيدملا ءف يحص) *Shahifat al-Madinah*; (ةنيدملا قاتيم) *Mithāq al-Madinah* ‘Covenant of Medina’ or (ةنيدملا روتسد) *Dustūr al-Madinah* all essentially meaning the same thing (see **W Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina, OUP 1956, Chapter 7** and for the historicity of the document, **Theodor Nöldeke and others, History of the Qur'an (edited and translated by Wolfgang H Behn), Brill, 2013, 320ff**). It established Islam not as a kinship group – the norm in tribal societies – but as a rule-bound community (the *ummah*) which claimed precedence over other groups by virtue of accepting a specific divine revelation as authentic, comprehensive, true and final. In so doing it established an aspirational model for all future Islamic political communities. None of this, of course, stopped most Muslims getting on with their lives. Even when from the C19th onwards more and more of them found themselves under non-Muslim rule, they often adapted themselves to this situation.

Where did Islamism come from?

Throughout history there have been many disputes among Muslims about the nature of legitimate rule, the obligations of power, the boundaries of the Islamic community, its relationship to non-Muslims, both in and outside the territorial domains of Muslim rulers, and the legitimate use of physical force.⁸⁹ But it is hard to talk of a specifically Islamic theory of political organisation.⁹⁰ And Muslims have throughout the centuries – and more particularly since their encounter with a disruptive global modernity sometime between the mid-seventeenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries – adapted themselves to a variety of often non-Muslim systems.⁹¹

But at the same time there emerged an important school of thought which held that the subjection of Muslims and their states to ‘infidel’ authority (something that traditional Islamic jurisprudence, which had evolved at a time of unquestioned Muslim hegemony, found hard to conceive and firmly rejected) was not just abnormal but intolerable. The itinerant activist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was to be paradigmatic in this regard.⁹²

89. For a flavour of the debate see *Crone 2004* and *Michael Cook, Ancient Religions, Modern Politics: The Islamic Case in Comparative Perspective, New Jersey, Princeton 2014*. Most Muslims probably continue to believe in principle at least that Islam provides a comprehensive map for the conduct of life in this world as well as entry to the next, that the first generation of Muslims provided a perfect model of orthopraxy and that Islam is a complete system for the ordering of human life on earth in the service of God. And many continue to aspire to a single global and self-governing Islamic community. When Muslims overwhelmingly lived in Muslim-governed states, the idea of such a community seemed part of the natural order. The overriding duty for Muslims in such circumstances was to avoid *fitna*, social discord leading to the destabilisation or destruction of the community (See *Crone 2004, 135ff*). This generally meant that any ruler, as long as he (and it was invariably a man) was nominally a Muslim and committed to enforcing a minimum of Islamic norms, was legitimate (one of the reasons President Sisi, for example, who is currently engaged with the Shaikh al-Azhar in a struggle to see who controls Islamic normativity in Egypt, is so keen to prosecute Egyptians, such as women who appear on Tik Tok, for immorality). From the earliest times it was also believed that a ruler had an obligation to repel the enemies of the *ummah* and enlarge the territories of Islam through conquest. This was the usual sense of *jihad*. See in general *Rudolph Peters, Jihad: A History in Documents, Princeton, 2016*. and *Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis' Path to Self-Destruction, London, 182ff*. *Patricia Crone, Jihad: Idea and History, Open Democracy, 30 April 2007* at https://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/jihad_4579.jsp is a good short guide to the evolution of the concept of 'defensive jihad'. For the recognition by early Muslims of the need to wage war to expand the territory controlled by Islam, see, for example, *al-Tabari's* commentary on Qur'an, 22,40 (Surat al Hajj), online at <https://archive.org/stream/tafseer-al-tabari/taftabry16#page/n573/mode/2up>. But whereas emergent European states came to see themselves as the heirs to Roman Law, Islamic states saw themselves as heirs to the Roman *imperium* and *auctoritas* – the supreme authority of the emperors – under God. Christianity has at least since Augustine held that the two spheres of secular and sacred authority are distinct. In the western tradition there is a formal doctrinal distinction between Caesar and God. Christians have accepted the legitimate authority of the secular state at least since Constantine, something explored with his usual subtlety by *Peter Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle, Princeton 2012* – and indeed in his other works on late antiquity. For anyone interested in the relationship between Constantine's successors and Popes, Christianity and Power, the development of St Augustine's thought about the Two Cities, the subsequent doctrine of the Two Swords and the evolution of *sacerdotium* and *regnum*, see for example *Eamon Duffy, Saints and Sinners: a History of the Papacy, New Haven 1997*; *Walter Ullman, The Carolingian Renaissance and the Idea of Kingship, Routledge 1969*; *Peter Heather, The Restoration of Rome, Barbarian Popes and Imperial Pretenders, Macmillan 2013*; *R A Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine, CUP 1988*; *James M Blythe (tr and ed), On the Government of Rulers: De Regimine Principum (Ptolemy of Lucca), Philadelphia 1997* and *Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages, Princeton, 2014*; *Peter H Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe's History, Allen Lane 2016*; *H J Mierau, Kaiser and Papst im Mittelalter, Köln 2010*; and *Annabel Brett, Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace, CUP 2005*. The assertion of papal supremacy in the roughly 100 years from Gregory VII to Innocent III and the Fourth Lateran Council – taking in the Investiture Crisis and Henry IV at Canossa – is the exception that proves the rule. Whatever the theoretical position of the Vatican at various moments since then, the secular state has inexorably strengthened its position (something recognised formally if belatedly in Leo XII's 1885 Encyclical, *Immortali Dei*). The case of the Eastern Roman Empire was rather different. But even there, as *Georg Ostrogorsky, Byzantinische Geschichte 324 – 1453, Munich 2006*, 5 notes, "So bleibt ein Übergewicht der kaiserlichen Gewalt über die kirchliche zu allen Zeiten das für Byzanz typische und sozusagen normale Verhältnis." The foundational texts in Christianity, of course, are *Matthew 22, Mark 12, Luke 20, John 18* and *Paul, Epistle to the Romans*, particularly 13.1ff ("the powers that be"), a key text not just for the Lutheran reformers of the C16th, (*Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought; The Age of Reformation, CUP 1978, Chapter 2*) but also during the German constitutional crisis of 1918/19 (see the brilliant exegesis by *Karl Barth, Paul, Der Römerbrief, TVZ Theologischer Verlag; Auflage: 20, 1999, 500ff*). The Italian humanists and jurists in the emergent republics and other city states of the C12th to the C14th, caught up in a struggle between the Papacy and the Empire, took their inspiration from Classical authors – mainly Latin, such as Sallust, Cicero or Tacitus, but also from Aristotle's Politics, available in Latin translation, which saw politics as the conduct of mundane matters by ordinary people in a secular setting (see *Duffy 1997, Chapter Three* and *Quentin Skinner, the Foundations of Modern Political Thought; The Renaissance, CUP 1997*). Taking their cue from Augustine (who was never influential in the Greek East, hence its rather different trajectory), the C16th reformers, such as Melancthon, Luther and (more pragmatically) Cromwell, saw the Church as the custodian of a moral and confessional not a temporal political order and therefore as having a solely pastoral not jurisdictional role (*Skinner 1978 passim*). It is true that this caused them also to posit the necessity for a legitimate political order of a Godly Ruler. But this in turn led to the powerful reframing by largely Spanish Dominicans and Jesuits, in the context of the Spanish conquests in South America, of the orthodox Thomist view that any human community could establish such an order without Christian revelation and could indeed maintain this order even if they rejected that revelation (*Skinner 1978, 167ff*; see also *Geoffrey Parker, Emperor: A New Life of Charles V, Yale 2019, Chapter 13* for background to the Valladolid Debates and *Ryan R. Gorman (2010) War and the Virtues in Aquinas's Ethical Thought, Journal of Military Ethics, 9:3, 245-261, DOI: 10.1080/15027570.2010.510865* for an account of Aquinas' thinking). They went on to argue that this meant the Pope had no power to order the alienation of the rights of the heathen. This is an intellectual current not replicated – and indeed unthinkable – in orthodox Islamic jurisprudence, whether Sunni or Shi'a (who hold different views about the nature but not the fact of Islamically legitimate rule), where the claims of prophetic authority and of the law flowing from that authority were and remain absolute. See *Hazem Kandil, Inside the Brotherhood, CUP 2015 (Kindle edition), 2950ff* for reflections on the different historical trajectories of western and Islamic traditions. For powerful examples of the differences between the Islamic, Christian and Hindu cases see *Cook 2014*. *Aziz al Azmeh, Muslim Kingship, I.B.Tauris 1997* discusses the transmission of ideas about absolute authority from ancient Near Eastern kingship through the eastern Roman empire to medieval Islamic polities. Even here, in the common areas of profane administration and the nature of kingly rule – *mu'amalat* and *mulk* – there is much continuity of practice between East and West. This is what Islamism overturns. In Islam the distinction is far less clear.

90. There was certainly a notable tradition in the Islamic world of 'Mirrors for Princes', particularly in its Persian-speaking parts: see *Mehrzad Boroujerdi, A Mirror for the Muslim Prince: Islam and the Theory of Statecraft, Syracuse University Press, 2012*. The most famous example is *Nizam al Mulk's Siyasat-Nama*, translated by *Hubert Darke, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, Routledge 2012*. But, as *Roel Meijer, Islamist Movements and the Political After the Arab Uprisings, POMEPS, 4 February 2014* at <http://pomeps.org/2014/02/04/islamist-movements-and-the-political-after-the-arab-uprisings/> remarks, "There is no theory in Islam comparable to Machiavelli's Prince, who is analyzed on his political merits not on his moral qualities." And while some Muslim scholars – such as Ibn Khaldun, al-Mawardi and others – often expressed views on what Shari'ah had to say about the sources and proper exercise of political authority, in practice there were multiple expressions of this authority in medieval times and there are certainly variations today: absolutist monarchies, constitutional monarchies, autocratic regimes, some form of electoral democracy (Indonesia and Turkey) or pseudo-theocracies (Iran). See for example, *Crone 2004*. *Lahoud 2005* provides a useful discussion of contemporary trends in the light of historical texts. She observes (68), "It is therefore impossible to claim that a reified model of Islamic politics exists. Yet despite the historical evidence that shows diverse positions on the subject of politics in Islam, the Islamists insist that what they are presenting is an "authentic" vision of Islamic politics."

91. And indeed developed a doctrine of the law of nations to match that of their western competitors: see *Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966* and the same author's *War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962*.

92. On al-Afghani, see *Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: the revolt against the West and the remaking of Asia (London: Penguin, 2012)*.

On this view, the problem was in part that the people were infused with too little Islam, rather than too much – the latter being the view of many Victorian era colonial officials, like Lord Cromer, who dominated British-occupied Egypt. Some Muslim activists went on to claim that Islam actively required armed resistance to western intrusion (something that appealed, of course, and still appeals not just to emergent Islamists but more widely – informing the hugely influential work of Frantz Fanon, for instance).⁹³

Many self-declared Muslim reformers (again, like al-Afghani, his colleague Muhammad Abduh, or the latter's protégé, Rashid Rida)⁹⁴ argued that it was only by adopting the ways of temporally successful non-Muslims that the restored global Islamic community (as they conceived it) could recover not just its dignity but its secular power and help Islam advance once more towards the God-given goal of world domination. This borrowing of western methods was to be accompanied, they asserted, by a revival of a properly Islamic spirit and practice.

And it is precisely here that Islamists distinguish themselves from non-Islamists: namely in the way in which they think such a restored and morally-renewed community should come into existence, and what this says about the nature of politics and of government.

These ideas, as they have evolved, are very different from the western tradition or indeed that of classical Islamic state practice, its jurists and theorists.⁹⁵ The terms *Islamic Fundamentalism*, *Political Islam* and *Islamism* all refer to this radically innovative mobilisation of Islam – not as a faith, or even as a civilisational project, but as a self-validating political ideology designed to reshape, not tradition, but modernity.⁹⁶

The foundational model for this form of sacralised, highly activist and contestatory social movement was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), launched by Hassan al-Banna in the Egyptian provincial city of Ismailiyya in March

93. On Islamically framed resistance to empire in this period, see Benjamin D. Hopkins 'Islam and Resistance in the British Empire', in D. Motadel (ed.), *Islam and the European Empires* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

94. See Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798 – 1939*, CUP 1983 and Mitchell 1993, 320ff. Secular reformers such as Muhammad Ali Pasha in Egypt or Sultan Abdul Hamid in Turkey probably shared similar views, but with different ambitions.

95. The importance of the separation of political from spiritual authority was a major theme of the Constitutional movements in the Ottoman Empire and Iran which flourished between the mid-C19th and early C20th (Faleh A. Jabar, *The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq, Saqi, London, 2003, 277ff* with references). It worked in Kemalist Turkey and partly in Pahlavi Iran and the new Iraqi state after 1921 (where the issue was used by the Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala to stir unrest) but not elsewhere. A characteristic response can be seen in the distinction drawn by certain Salafi scholars between Christian and Islamic/Islamist views of political authority and their emphasis on the historical context within which secular sovereignty and eventually representative democracy emerged. They use this as an argument for the essential incompatibility of Islam and democracy: see *Ovimir Anjum, Salafis and Democracy: Doctrine and Context, The Muslim World, Issue 00, 2016* at https://www.academia.edu/31257969/Salafis_and_Democracy_Doctrine_and_Context?auto=download. In different guises the same argument occurs in some earlier more sophisticated Islamist discourse and more crudely later: see Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament, CUP 1992, 60ff*. This is an interesting case of polemicists applying a particular standard of historicity to one tradition and another to a second. Behind it doubtless lies the fear that opening Islamic tradition to historical enquiry will compromise the claims of Islam – as both Islamists and traditional jurists understand it – to absolute authority on the basis of *sola scriptura*: there is after all no parallel in the Islamic tradition to Lorenzo Valla's demolition of Papal claims to temporal authority through his scholarly exposure of the *Donation of Constantine* as a forgery in 1440. Hobbes – who pointed out correctly that Christianity does not have a code of revealed law and extensively if idiosyncratically considered the relationship between the sovereignty and laws of earthly rulers and those of God in Chapters 31-32 and Part 3 of *Leviathan* – might have located the difference not in some essential quality of Arabness, Islam or Europeanness but in the importance for the western tradition of scepticism about the possibility of ever knowing the Divine Will. This refusal to accept prophecy at face value – which caused Hobbes and Hume after him to be accused of atheism – is more or less absent in the Islamic tradition. Indeed most Islamic scholars would identify the prophetic function as the essential underpinning of the soteriological and therefore Islamically legitimate state (even if they then use this – and an account of western political structures as functional rather than ideological – to argue for some sort of separation of powers under Islam: see for example the discussion of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's political thought at Jabar 2003, 280ff). In an illuminating contrast, even Savonarola – an ordained Dominican – argued in his 1498 *Tract on the Constitution and Government of the City of Florence* not for theocracy or the rule of the saints but for a Republic, with "the whole body of the citizens as the supreme authority in political affairs" (Skinner 1997, Chapter 6: see also 201ff for the intertwining of humanism and legal scholarship in early modern Europe and 208ff for the parallel emergence of a Biblical criticism founded on historical and philological methods not faith alone, two seminal moments in the development of modern European political thought).

96. On Islamism as an evolving ideology concerned with modernity see the comprehensive discussion in Samuel Tadros, *Islamist vs. Islamist: The Theologico-Political Questions, The Hudson Institute, 18 December 2014* at <https://www.hudson.org/research/10883-islamist-vs-islamist-the-theologico-political-questions>. Robert W. Hefner, *Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization in Frédéric Volpi, Political Islam: A Critical Reader, Routledge 2011, John Calvert, Islamism: A Documentary and Reference Guide, Westport CT, 2008* and Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, New Jersey, Princeton 2009* provide selections of readings illustrating this. Elie Kedourie (2), *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies, Chicago 1970, Chapter 11* is also worth reading for the historical background.

1928.⁹⁷ Al-Banna sought to reimagine the boundaries of the political, not just the religious, community. For al-Banna, if Islam was the criterion, then that political community was not ethnic, linguistic or national. Rather, it was defined exclusively by religious affiliation, a revived, reprogrammed and repoliticised Ummah.⁹⁸

Although there was often a strong whiff of Egyptian nationalism about the MB, from the start it tended to dismiss the nation state as an un-Islamic innovation.⁹⁹ But in order to carve out a space for itself in a world consisting precisely of such nation states, it needed to give a new and persuasive account of their socio-political failings and promote a new, distinctively Islamic and drastically confrontational model for their remedy.

Advocates of this approach in the Arab world and elsewhere called for the placing of a flat-screen version of Islam at the centre of political, social and economic life. They defined the largely Christian and secular West as the moral and cultural 'Other' and claimed that the restoration of a specifically pan-Arab caliphate, to replace the tarnished Ottoman version, would restore the allegedly lost glory of the Muslim world.¹⁰⁰

They drew on the ideas of earlier Islamic reformists, mixed with elements of what came rather misleadingly to

97. Al-Banna's account is in his *Mudhakkirat al Da'wa wal Da'ya*, conveniently translated by Calvert 2008 *op cit*, 15ff. For the MB's history see Mitchell 1993; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement*, Princeton, Kindle Edition 2013; John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, London, Hurst and Company 2010; Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power*, Saqi, Kindle Edition 2013; Lorenzo Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, London 2010 and Lorenzo Vidino, *Joining and Leaving the Brotherhood*, Columbia 2020; and Frampton, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: Between Enmity and Engagement*, Harvard 2018. J Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt*, Washington, 1950 (self-published) at <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015005286995;view=1up;seq=121;skin=mob> is of considerable interest given the author's personal connections with Hassan al-Banna and closeness to the events in question. Israel Elad Altman, *Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, 1928-2007*. The Hudson Institute, January 2009 at <https://www.hudson.org/research/9841-strategies-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-movement-1928-2007> is an excellent survey of the MB's evolving strategies, doctrines and geographical expansion. For those who read German Annette Ranko, *Die Muslim Bruderschaft: eine mächtige Verbindung ('The Muslim Brotherhood: a Powerful Association')*, Kindle Edition, Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg 2014 is a useful primer and contains interesting insights from her field work; the same applies to the more journalistic Petra Ramsauer, *Muslimbrüder: Ihre Geheime Strategie, Ihr Globales Netzwerk ('Muslim Brothers: Their Secret Strategy, Their Global Network')*, Molden Verlag, 2014, which has useful chapters on the MB in Libya, the IMB and the Muslim Sisters. Chapter 31 in Esposito and Shahin 2013 is a useful brief survey of MB thinking. Euben and Zaman 2009 and Calvert 2008 have selections of relevant primary texts in translation. There are many online resources in Arabic or English, to be used with discretion, at <http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/>, on the MB's English-language site <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/>, on various national sites, such as <http://www.ikhwansyria.com> and on more individual sites. Michaël Prazan, *The Brotherhood, France Télévisions, Planète and the RTBF*, 2013 at www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3axL8h59LQ is polemical and openly hostile to the MB but has some good documentary and archive evidence and interviews with senior MB figures and their critics and is a quick way to get a sense of their history and beliefs. The accompanying book, Michaël Prazan, *Frères Musulmans: Enquête sur la dernière idéologie totalitaire, ('The MB: An Enquiry into the Last Totalitarian Ideology')*, Éditions Grasset et Fasquelle 2014 is similarly helpful if used selectively and with caution.

98. The MB deliberately sought to reassert the primacy of Islam over politics. The account of their motivation in *The Cordoba Foundation, The MENA Report, Vol 1, Issue 11, November 2013*, 21 at https://www.thecordobafoundation.com/attach/TCF_MENA_NOV_WEB.pdf is characteristic: "Al-Banna urged al-Azhar scholars to organise voice their disapproval to the Egyptian authorities, seeking change and the revival of the umma, using Egypt as the springboard. His efforts were unsuccessful, as it proved very difficult to change centuries of tradition of separation between Din wa Dawla (religion and government). Since 661 AD, Muslim scholars had been separated from the sphere of politics; their role in the process of appointing new caliphs was significantly reduced, though their consent and public approval was sought by the ruling class for the sake of legitimacy. A peaceful coexistence between the two (ruler and scholar) was observed as long as the 'ulama were not vocal or organised in their disapproval of the sovereign.... Members of the Brotherhood believe that moral and Islamic religious values fused with democracy would rid society of these ill (sc excessive individualism, the debasement of women and social chaos, all indicative of the MB's view of the world), while keeping the positive aspects of political stability...The Brotherhood views the separation of the state and church not as an Islamic issue, but relevant to the specifics of Western history. It believes that Islam developed as a complete system of ethics and laws, a perfect unity in all aspects of life. Power, in the eyes of the ideologues, is vital to support the values and teachings of the religion, without which Islam loses its authority and in turn the ability to protect its teachings and values. This would lead to disunity and weakness as Islam is dispossessed of its power." The whole report is well worth reading as a revealing – if sanitised – Islamist-flavoured account of what the Brotherhood stood and stands for.

99. For a fuller treatment of this whole issue, see my *The Chatham House Version Revisited, Policy Exchange, 20 November 2017* at <https://policyexchange.org.uk/news/western-policy-in-middle-east-fudges-dangers-of-islamism-says-former-uk-ambassador-to-saudi-arabia/>.

100. The instrumentalisation of a revived caliphate was also at the centre of debate during World War One in the Arab Bureau in Cairo and indeed in the circles around the great French consul in the Maghreb, General Lyautey. It remained an issue in the region for at least the next 20 years, from the Azhar Caliphate Conference of 1926 onwards. See Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*, Routledge, 2014 and Kedourie 1970, Chapter 7, *Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-1952*. For Lyautey see Jalila Sbai, *Quand la France rêvait d'un calife pour son empire musulman*, *Orient XXI*, 8 septembre 2016 at <http://orientxxi.info/magazine/quand-la-france-revait-d-un-calife-pour-son-empire-musulman.1454>. For connections between IS and this debate see Zelin 2015.

and vanguardist violence.¹⁰⁵

Islamism and Violence

Al-Banna may initially have conceived of jihad as primarily a struggle for social transformation through preaching and persuasion. But he soon came to promote what he called “*fann al mawt*” – “the art of death”.¹⁰⁶ He urged his followers to scorn life and claimed that ultimate martyrdom could only be attained through death in the service of the divine. At the MB’s fifth conference in 1939, al-Banna articulated in guarded terms a doctrine of armed physical force.¹⁰⁷ At about the same time, he allowed the creation of a paramilitary force – the Brotherhood’s ‘Special Apparatus’, or ‘Secret Organisation’.¹⁰⁸ This unit then became involved in violent attacks – including

105. **Lahoud 2010, 144** remarks, “(Islamism) conceives of military jihad as one of several means to an end. (Jihadism) conceives of jihad as the only legitimate means to an end that the jihadis are yet to envision. Until further notice, then, jihad is the end itself”. In both cases there is a doctrine of permissible coercive physical force. The difference is in the symbolic valency of such force. The same author’s *The Evolution of Modern Jihadism in the online Oxford Research Encyclopedia: Religion*, at <https://oxfordre.com/religion> is another useful account of some of these issues. **Omar Ashour, Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist Military Relations in Egypt, Brookings 2015** at <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/collusion-to-crackdown-english.pdf> claims that al-Banna opposed revolutions. But what he opposed were coups: ideological revolutions from within were fine. And, as he acknowledges, in both 1952 and 2011 the EMB in fact supported such coups. See **Mitchell 1993, 312** for the essentially revolutionary nature of the MB, and **319**, “For out of the fact of power in being, and in use in defence of “eternal” goals, emerged a self-righteous and intolerant arrogance which opened an unbridgeable gap between the Society [sc of the MB] and its fellow citizens”. The judgement echoes what many people saw happen in Egypt in 2012/13. Mawdudi acknowledged this in 1939: “The truth is that Islam is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to alter the social order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals”: this remains a common theme – **Vidino 2010, 120f**. So **Devji 2005, 26f**, “This (sc Islamic fundamentalism) had been part and parcel of Cold War politics and was concerned with the founding through revolution of an ideological state, fashioned in many respects on the communist model that was so popular in Africa and Asia following the Second World War.... communist ideas about the party as vanguard of the revolution, the state as an explicitly ideological institution meant to produce a utopian society, and the like, were central to the movement”. See also **Ranko 2014, 836** “Damit wollte die Gruppe ihre intellektuelle Führerschaft in der aufkommenden ägyptischen Demokratie-bewegung etablieren. Dies ist jedoch kläglich gescheitert, wie die Massendemonstrationen gegen Präsident Mursi im Jahr 2013, die in dessen Sturz durch das Militär mündeten, zeigen.” For the claim to represent Islam see again **Ranko 2014, 1076** (an interview with an MB activist): “Als ich Hussein die Frage stelle, weshalb die MB in Politik und Gesellschaft engagiere, obwohl das je für eine offiziell verbotene und verfolgte Gruppe äußerst riskant sei, schaut er mich völlig ungläubig an und scheint sich fassungslos zu fragen, wie mir diese offensichtliche Tatsache nur entgehen konnte. “Natürlich, weil wir die Stimme des wahren Islam sind, sagte er” – and also the reflections at **1115f, Sheri Berman, Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society, Perspectives on Politics, 1(2), 257-272. doi:10.1017/S1537592703000197, APSA Vol 1/No 2, June 2003** at <http://carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/berman.pdf> is excellent on the revolutionary purpose of the Islamist civil society project in the Middle East and North Africa. This is the same point made by **Samuel Tadros (1), Mapping Egyptian Islamism, The Hudson Institute, 18 December 2014** at <https://www.hudson.org/research/10882-mapping-egyptian-islamism>, 11, “This criticism points to an inherent feature of the Brotherhood despite its claims to the contrary: its methodology is ultimately dependent on using state power to enforce its vision. Hence, despite the early stages indicating a bottom-up approach of focusing on the individual, the family and society, those stages are merely necessary to reach power.” One reason the EMB gave up violence was that peaceful gradualism was a more effective socio-revolutionary tactic. **Madawi al Rasheed, Saudi Islamist Euphoria (delivered at John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding and IISS Workshop on The Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Spring, London, 9-11 September 2013)** discusses the “representative discourse in support of revolution” of the Sahwa Shaikh Salman al-Awdah, a reference point for MB sympathisers inside the Kingdom, who wrote *As’ilat al thawra* (‘Questions of the Revolution’) in 2012 in response to the Arab Spring: “he defines revolution as building on the past, reform and reconstruction rather than destruction. It always starts peacefully but may later become militarised when confronted by oppression”: for the complete text see <http://media.islamtoday.net/real/asela-thwra/asela-thwra.pdf> and for further commentary **Madawi al Rasheed, Muted Modernists, London 2015**. **Henry Kissinger, World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History, Penguin, 2014** talks of the revolutionary ambition of “al Banna’s project for world transformation”. More widely, **Shadi Hamid, The Roots of the Islamic State’s Appeal, The Atlantic, 31 October 2014** at <http://m.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/the-roots-of-the-islamic-states-appeal/382175/> criticises Kissinger and suggests that Islamism is an essential element in re-legitimising a Westphalian state system in the region. But the distinctions he draws between the various manifestations of Islamism are less clear than he claims, and his assessment of the MB as a largely constructive if illiberal movement seems to me highly questionable. In any case, an observation of **Clement Therme** (in an interview for ‘*L’Âme de l’Iran*’ by **Jean-Pierre Perrin: personal copy**), speaking of Iran, applies to the MB as well: “Il y a toujours cette dialectique entre nation et révolution. Les purs révolutionnaires sont dans la négation de l’intérêt national, comme le sont d’une façon générale les islamistes. Ils pensent que la création de la nation a été inventée par les Occidentaux pour diviser l’Oumma (la communauté musulmane). C’est ce qui disait Khomeiny lui-même, en accord avec les Frères musulmans (dans le monde sunnite) sur ce point. C’est Rafsanjani qui a rétabli l’idée de l’intérêt national.” We may have already passed beyond notions of the Westphalian: for some reflections on which see **Brendan Simms, Michael Axworthy and Patrick Milton, Ending the New Thirty Years War, The New Statesman, 26 January 2016** at <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/01/ending-new-thirty-years-war>

106. It is instructive to examine the definitions of jihad (praising the assassins of Sadat, the Afghan Mujahidin and various insurgent movements in Eritrea, the Philippines and Palestine) of the fifth MB Murshid (Supreme Guide – in theory the supreme position in the Brotherhood as a whole), **Mustafa Mashhour, Volume 5 of The Laws of Da’wa: Jihad is the Way (originally published in 1995)** translated into English at

http://palwatch.org/STORAGE/special%20reports/Jihad_is_the_way_by_Mustafa_Mashhur.pdf. There are some helpful reflections on the evolution of the wider concept in the C20th under the pressure of evolving Islamist doctrine from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) onwards by **Aaron Zelin, Socio-Political Background and Intellectual Undergirding of the Ikhwanī Breakaway Factions: 1954-1981, The Washington Institute, August 2013** at <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Zelin20130820-Jihadology-BrotherhoodBreakaway.pdf>. **Devji 2005** traces the subsequent metastasis of the concept away from its moorings in traditional models of authority and religious genealogies. **David Thomson, Les Revenants, Seuil, 2016** and **Graeme Wood, The Way of the Strangers New York 2017** provide graphic testimony from Islamic State fighters about their own understanding of jihad: for them it is not about cultivating the inner virtues. Classically, offensive jihad needed the authority of a properly constituted Muslim sovereign or Imam at its head. That obligation gave rise to a specialised vocabulary designed to describe those who waged war in this sense – so *jahada*, *mujahid*, *marabit*, *ribat* and so forth. In the early Islamic period (and under the Ottomans) new conquests occurred with great regularity. But as Islamic empires grew, so did social and political strains, leading to division, conflict and instability. This was not dissimilar on the face of it to the way in which medieval Europe emerged out of the wreckage of the late Roman Empire and its Gothic, Vandal, Lombard and Frankish successor states. But, as already described, whereas emergent European states came to see themselves as the heirs to Roman Law, particularly with the revived study of the subject at Ravenna and Bologna and the attention paid specifically to the *Codex Justinianus* from the C11th onwards (**Skinner 1997** and the masterful account by **Max Weber, Politik als Beruf, Hofenberg 2016**), Islamic states saw themselves as heirs to the Roman imperial authority under God.

107. For the period around the Fifth Congress, see **Mitchell 1993, 14-16, King Faisal Institute, Al Ikhwan al Muslimuuna: Al Iddiyuulujaatu fii Muwaajahati al Dawlati al Wataniyyati bi-Misr (The Muslim Brothers: Ideologies Against the Nationalist State in Egypt) – Masaaraat (King Faisal Institute), September 2013**, 3, 5 and **Ashour 2010, 35ff. Mitchell 1993, 320** sums up the period until 1954 thus: “Violence with the Brothers...was in many ways a response to the situation in Egypt The difference lay in the Islamic dimension, which the Brothers claimed as their own, and...precipitated a variety of violence in both political and social life... characterized primarily by rigid intolerance”. **Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Ithaca 1998, 3ff**, who uses more Brotherhood accounts of their own actions, is more forgiving. **Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, I.B.Tauris 2002, 29** in contrast describes the actions of al-Nizam al-Khass as “systematic terrorism”.

108. **Al-Nizam al-Khass: Mitchell 1993** has the foundational account in English of this body.

assassinations – targeting the Egyptian government, Egyptian Jews and the British.¹⁰⁹

On top of this, there is the question of the Brotherhood's relationship with the writings of the essayist, novelist and socio-cultural critic, Sayyid Qutb – executed by Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser's government in 1966. Qutb, who had gravitated towards the Brotherhood in the late 1940s, became its most significant and protean ideologue. He remains central in complex ways to the Brotherhood and Islamist thinking in general. Qutb's

109. See *Mitchell 1993, 313ff*, *Pargeter 2013, Chapter 5* and *Kandil 2015, 2212ff*. *Ashour 2010* is a serious and scholarly attempt to make sense of the history from a stance of broad sympathy to the MB. See also his short summary of the MB's historic relationship to violence, which he sees as part of a dialectic with the violence of state actors, at *Omar Ashour, Will Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Return to Political Violence? BBC News Middle East, 30 July 2014* at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-28524510>. *Mokhtar Awad, Egypt's New Radicalism, Foreign Affairs, 4 February 2016* at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-02-04/egypts-new-radicalism> is a helpful summary of the EMB's relationship with violent extremism (among other things). For al-Banna's ideas on jihad, martyrdom and "fann al mawt" ("the art of death") see *Mitchell 1993, 206-8*: he concludes, "it was this spirit [sc to love death more than life]...which fellow Egyptians - Muslim and non-Muslim alike - fear and which, coupled with political activism, Egyptian governments of all shades have been unable to tolerate". That holds true today for many, when some members of the EMB again claim to love death more than they love life. Al-Banna's wider views on Islam are described extensively in *Mitchell 1993, Part III ('Ideology')*, *Pargeter 2013* and *Wickham 2013*. For the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) and violent jihad in general see *Lefèvre 2013, 101-2* and *114 ff*. Their internal debate about the role of violence continued after the Hama disaster: *Lefèvre, 139ff* and *170ff*. The SMB's Abu Mus'ab al-Suri (real name, Mustafa Setmariam: author of the key jihadi text, 'The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance') who had fought with the SMB's Fighting Vanguard in the late 1970s/early 1980s, spent time in Spain and London, where he reportedly worked with the Algerian GIA, *ibid*, *145*. He later became a key influence on al-Zarqawi in Iraq. See *Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaida Strategist, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, Hurst and Company, London 2007*. For Zarqawi and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood see *Brown 2006, 12* and *18*. For Iraq see *Meijer 2005*. For Yusuf al-Qaradawi and other MB apologists for violence see *Vidino 2010, 211ff*. The 7th Murshid, Muhammad Mahdi Akef, is reported by *Eric Trager, The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011* at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-africa/2011-09-01/unbreakable-muslim-brotherhood> as telling him, "We believe that Zionism, the United States and England are gangs that kill children and women and men and destroy houses and fields. Zionism is a gang not a country. So we will resist them until they don't have a country". The EMB's Safwat al-Hegazi is captured on film in *Prazan 2013* talking gleefully about the need to kill Jews, "the sons of apes and pigs". The MB condemned the killing of Osama bin Laden and referred to him with the honorific title 'Shaikh': *Trager 2011*. The claim that violence is the work of rogue individuals not the MB as a whole has been a constant in the MB's history. I have heard it directly from them myself. In 1948 Hassan al-Banna disowned the assassins of the Egyptian politician, Nuqrashi Pasha; and his successor, Hassan al-Hodeibi, those who tried to assassinate Nasser in 1954. In a move almost identical to the current EMB leadership, al-Banna claimed in his 1948/9 pamphlet, *Qawl Fasl*, that the MB as a whole could not be accountable for the acts of its members, blamed Judge Khazindar for his own assassination and said that since the MB leadership was in prison at the time, they were not responsible either. Indeed their imprisonment was one cause of the violence. Instead, "international Zionism, communism and the partisans of atheism and depravity" were to blame: see *Mitchell 1993, 69-71* and *147ff* and *Kandil 2015, 2232f*. More recently, *Shlomi Eldar, Is Hamas Working with Wilayat Sinai, Al-Monitor, 6 July 2015* at <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/israel-gaza-hamas-is-sinai-smuggling-weapons-blockade-egypt.html> discusses alleged links between Hamas and jihadists in the Sinai. See also *Ashour 2014, Graham-Harrison 2016, Berti and Gold 2016* and *Gold 2015, Tadros (1) 2014, 81ff* discusses the space the revolutions of 2011 provided to these and other jihadi groups – before the counter-revolutionary reaction set in. *Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia, CUP 2010 (Kindle Edition)* is good on the mobilising role that the MB played in Afghanistan. It started in November 1980 with the despatch by the then Murshid of Kamal al-Sanani (Sayyid Qutb's brother-in-law), on a 40-day scoping trip to Pakistan, where he met the Palestinian chief ideologue of Al-Qaeda, Abdullah Azzam (see *Wright 2006* and *Calvert 2008, 195ff*).

writings have been used to justify multiple forms of violence by other Islamist groups¹¹⁰ – from Al-Jihad (the assassins of Anwar al-Sadat) and Gama'ah al-Islamiyyah (GaI), to the Syrian Fighting Vanguard, the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) in Algeria in the 1990s, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in Libya from the 1990s to the early 2000s and Al-Qaeda (AQ) and its various offshoots today, including the Islamic State (IS), Jabhat Fateh al-Sham/al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.¹¹¹ That violence has been characterised by the Muslim scholar, Aziz al-Azmeh, as an inevitable

110. The relationship with Qutb is undoubtedly complex but highly significant. There is a sample of his writings with commentary in *Euben and Zaman 2009, Chapter 3* and some remarks on Qutb and the equally important Mawdudi, in *Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, IB Tauris 2002, 23ff*. Qutb's views were contested at the time within the MB, leading to a qualified written rebuttal in the name of the then Supreme Guide, who had earlier endorsed them. And it may well be the case that his writings and practice diverge – with the latter being more pragmatic than the former. But he advocated violent jihad to establish a truly Islamic state. And the real issue is the influence his writings have had and still have. These – principally *'In the Shadows of the Qur'an'* and *'Milestones'* – continue to be seen as inspirational by AQ and other jihadist groups. They remain part of the MB's curriculum. They have never been subject to a proper critique within the MB or wider Islamist movements. And since his execution by Nasser in 1966, on the grounds of plotting a coup with the violent vanguardist group, 'The 1965 Organisation' (something he admitted in his pamphlet *"limadha 'aadamuunii"*, *"Why They Executed Me"*: see *Frampton 2018, 292ff* for an account of the episode), the MB has never renounced his place in their history. Direct criticism of him is very rare. And many recent MB leaders have shown a distinct Qutbist strain in their thinking. *Ayman al-Zawahiri* cited him specifically as the father of jihadism in his memoir, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*: see *Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, CUP 2009, 4ff* and *Thomas Hegghammer, The Caravan: Abdullah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad, CUP 2020, 39ff* for the wider genealogy. Muhammad Mahdi Akef, the 7th Murshid, who was imprisoned with Qutb, is captured on film by *Prazan 2013* describing *Milestones* as "a fine book, nothing reprehensible" and Qutb himself as a martyr and a great man. *Prazan 2014, 1387 - 1441* amplifies this apologia and at 3569 quotes Dr Hani al-Banna, founder of the UK-based Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), as a self-confessed admirer of Qutb. *Kandil 2015, 3548* remarks: "Yet Qutb's writings have remained the main stock of every [MB] cultivation curriculum, and the bread-and-butter of cultivators on all levels". In recent times, a good account of the use of his writings as the basis for haraki (activist) Salafism is *Hassan Abu Hanieh and Dr Muhammad Abu Rumman, The "Islamic State Organisation": The Sunni Crisis and the Struggle of Global Jihadism, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin 2015* at https://www.academia.edu/15501334/The_Islamic_State_Organization_The_Sunni_Crisis_and_the_Struggle_of_The_Global_Jihadizm?auto_download=true&email_work_card=view-paper. *Mokhtar Awad, The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood, The Hudson Institute, 27 July 2017* at <https://www.hudson.org/research/13787-the-rise-of-the-violent-muslim-brotherhood> and *Eric Trager (2), Cairo Bombing Exposes the Muslim Brotherhood's Jihadist Tilt, The Washington Institute, 2 October 2017* at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cairo-bombing-exposes-the-muslim-brotherhoods-jihadist-tilt> discuss a new strain of MB doctrinal justification for violence arising partly out of splits within the movement – with reference to rivalries between Qutbists and others – in the years since 2011. For historical attempts by the EMB to construct a formal justification for physical force see *Uriya Shavit, The Muslim Brothers' Conception of Armed Insurrection against an Unjust Regime, Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 51, Issue 4, 2015, 600-617, published online 24 April 2015* at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00263206.2015.1014344> and *Reuven Berko, The Concept of Deterrence in Arab and Muslim Thought: The Various Approaches of the Muslim Brotherhood, Working paper, The Herzliya Conference, June 2012* at <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/?CategoryID=580&ArticleID=3508> and <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/ReuvenBerko.pdf>. Qutb was not anomalous. During a debate at the Cairo International Book Fair in 1992, also involving the MB-aligned Shaikh Muhammad al-Ghazali of al-Azhar, the then Murshid, Ma'moun al-Hodeibi, praised the actions of the EMB's clandestine armed militia, the *Nizam al-Khass*, as an act of divine worship, echoing al-Banna's claim that Islam had made military power "sacred" (*Ashour 2010, 39*). Shortly afterwards, his liberal opponent in the debate, the Speaker of Parliament and well-known author, Farag Foda, was assassinated by members of *Gal*. Hodeibi and Ghazali both said this was justified. See *Georges Corm, Pensée et Politique dans le Monde Arabe, Paris 2015 (Kindle edition), 5533ff* for the background: a prominent Sudanese opponent of Islamism, Mahmood Taha, was hanged at the same time in Khartoum, and another, Nasr Abou Zeid, hounded out of his university position in Egypt (on this case and others see also *Kim Ghattas, Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Rivalry that Unravelling the Middle East, London 2020, 183ff*). One of Foda's unrepentant murderers was released under the Morsi government, near the end of his sentence, as were Muhammad al-Zawahiri and Abdud al-Zumar, both involved in Sadat's assassination: see *Thomas Joscelyn, Ayman al Zawahiri's brother released from Egyptian prison, Long War Journal, 9 March 2016* at <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/ayman-al-zawahiris-brother-released-from-an-egyptian-prison.php> and *Tom Perry, In free Egypt, Jihad leader says time for gun is over, Reuters, 18 March 2011* at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-islamist-militancy-idUKTRE72H63F20110318> and <http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL6E8EJ6LM20120319T>. The former later called for jihad against the Jews and took part in the September 2012 attack on the US Embassy. The Jordanian-Palestinian jihadi, Abdullah Azzam – on whom see now *Hegghammer 2020* – who was instrumental in the creation of Al-Qaeda (AQ), was originally a Muslim Brother, as separately were the Egyptians, Ayman al-Zawahiri (imprisoned for involvement in Sadat's assassination and a former associate of the seventh Murshid Muhammad Mahdi Akef, Khairat al-Shatir and Morsi) and Omar Abdul Rahman ("the blind Shaikh" imprisoned in the US for his sponsorship of the 1993 attempt to blow up the WTC), both of whom had personal connections to Qutb, the Palestinian Abu Qatada and the Syrian Omar al-Bakri ("the Tottenham Ayatollah"). Osama bin Laden was allegedly recruited as a member at school in Jeddah in the 1970s. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad claimed that he was attracted to violent jihad in Kuwait after attending MB youth camps in the desert: *9/11 Commission Report, 145*. Roshonara Choudhry, who tried to assassinate the British MP Stephen Timms in May 2010, claimed to have been inspired to do so by watching a lecture by Azzam on YouTube: *Nelly Lahoud, The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis Exclusion of Women from Jihad, Combating Terrorism Centre, and Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, USA – published online 20 February 2014* at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2013.772511#vYp9eVJGSy0>. Qutb's *Milestones* has been implicated in the radicalisation of inmates in British gaols: see *Sean O'Neill, Prisons Are Breeding a New Wave of Extremists, The Times, 8 February 2020* at <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/prisons-are-breeding-a-new-wave-of-terrorists-zl6smng9w?shareToken=9ff9edd6d3450a0fc981e9d84aa069c0>. Akef called Osama bin Laden a *mujahid* and approved AQ attacks against "the occupier" in an extensive interview in 2008: on his death he himself was hailed as a *mujahid* by other violent Islamists – *Eric Trager (2), Cairo Bombing Exposes the Muslim Brotherhood's Jihadist Tilt, The Washington Institute, 2 October 2017* at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cairo-bombing-exposes-the-muslim-brotherhoods-jihadist-tilt>. This has been Qaradawi's position too. The MB praised Omar Abdul Rahman as a martyr, with a place in the highest heaven, on his death in late 2017: <https://www.ikhwanonline.info/%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%ae%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b9%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d9%8a-%d8%ae-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af/>. The senior IS leader, Abdul Naser Qardash, captured by the Iraqi Security Forces in 2020, has cited Qutb as a major ideological influence on the Islamic State: see *Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, Assessing the Abdal Nasser Qardash Interview, Pundicity, 30 June 2020* at <http://www.aymennjawad.org/24341/assessing-the-abdul-nasser-qardash-interview>.
111. Qaradawi has justified suicide attacks against Israeli civilians, called frequently in sermons for the killing of Jews and praised Hitler: see *Vidino 2010, note 142, 259* and *Prazan 2013*, who captures him doing so on film. See also *Ian Johnson, A Mosque in Munich, Boston/New York 2010. Pargeter 80-81* comments on the use by the Syrian MB of extreme violence in the late 1970s: "It seems that in typical Ikhwani style, it wasn't so much the fact that Hadid was prepared to use violence that bothered the leadership, but rather that he was doing so in an unprepared and reckless manner". At 181 she comments, "Whilst the Ikhwan is keen to present itself as a peaceful organisation and has proven itself to be largely pacific, it does have a history of getting involved in violence when the opportunity has presented itself." She earlier – at 42 – quotes the EMB dissident, Abdul Mun'im Abul Futuh (on whom see *Samuel Tadros (1), Mapping Egyptian Islamism, The Hudson Institute, 18 December 2014* at <https://www.hudson.org/research/10882-mapping-egyptian-islamism>, 99-100), "Our rejection of violence wasn't on principle... violence was acceptable and the difference was only in timing and utility". From the 1930s, the concept of violence was enshrined in its famous motto, which remains the maxim today, "Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope". That maxim is found in Hamas' Charter. *Beverly Milton-Edwards and Steven Farrell, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement, Polity Press (Kindle edition), 2010, 232*, draw a distinction between the MB and PIRA/Sinn Fein, "Hamas went into politics to keep its guns not lay them down."

consequence of the search for an unattainable authenticity.¹¹²

Qutb was deeply influenced by the thought of his contemporary, the South Asian Islamist ideologue, Abul A'la Mawdudi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, from whom he seems to have derived the ideas of 'jahiliyyah' (the pre-Islamic state of ignorance which both men used to characterise the condition of modern Muslim communities) and 'hakimiyyah' (the absolute sovereignty of God from which there can be no human derogation).¹¹³ The two of them are perhaps the most important and influential Islamist thinkers of the last 100 years.

Islamism as construed initially by al-Banna,¹¹⁴ and most systematically by Qutb and Mawdudi, is a transformative project. It rejects most existing political systems as un-Islamic. It seeks to replace the secular and post-Westphalian world with a revolutionary new Islamised order, both nationally and internationally. And this is where the distinction that some like to draw between 'moderate' and 'extremist' Islamisms breaks down. The Muslim Brotherhood, often seen as an exemplar of the former current,¹¹⁵ has always been clear that it hopes for the return of the Caliphate – however distant a goal this has been. Furthermore, it has been prepared to sanction the use of physical force in circumstances where events do not move in its favour, or they are not allowed to operate with sufficient freedom (the judgement of which they reserve to themselves).¹¹⁶ Particularly in its Qutbist and subsequently Salafised-forms,¹¹⁷ it has also been a school for many of the most dangerous Islamist

112. **Azme** 2004, 22. He distinguishes helpfully between *l'islam vecu* and *l'islam utopique*, as does **Ahmed** 2016. **Suleiman Mourad**, *The Mosaic of Islam: A Conversation with Perry Anderson*, Verso, London/New York, 2016 points out that, "..... the only way Islamic terrorism can be defeated is by understanding its theology and producing a counter to it. As long as we deny this, there is no way we can gain the upper hand over militant Islam." It is not therefore simply a matter of producing better washing machines (as Nixon famously suggested to Khrushchev during the 'Kitchen Debate' in 1959). The literature on the relationship between ideology (including Islamism) and violence is huge: for a judicious review and some helpful conclusions see **Donald Holbrook and John Horgan**, *Terrorism and Ideology: Cracking the Nut, Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 13, Issue 6, December 2019*. Olivier Roy remarks in the French *Sénat Rapport*, "les acteurs capitalisent sur le ressentiment envers l'Occident, en présentant la promotion de la sharia comme la défense d'une authenticité culturelle face à l'occidentalisation". Indeed.

113. See **Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr**, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, OUP 1996; *The Princeton Encyclopaedia of Islamic Political Thought (multiple editors)*, Princeton 2013, 332 ff; and **Calvert** 2010, 213ff. For the Jel see **Nasr** 2001, 93ff. The Jel's activist youth wing, the *Islami Jamaat-e-Talaba* (IJT), through its "powerful and radical Islamist onslaught against the state" was instrumental in the overthrow of the Bhutto government in Pakistan in 1977 and the seizure of power by the Islamising General Zia ul Haq (an admirer of Mawdudi, who attempted to introduce his writings into military promotion exams) with all the disasters which that entailed.

114. In addition to the writings cited elsewhere see, for example, *Nahwa al Nour* ('Towards the Light'), al-Banna's 1936 open letter to King Farouq: <http://ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=802> and the other excerpts translated in **Calvert** 2008, 15ff. For **Qutb**, *Ma'alim fil Tariq (Milestones)* is the critical text.

115. Partly because they proclaim the virtues of '*al-wasatiyyah*' ('the middle way'). But this isn't some form of Anthony Giddens Third Way. It is a specifically Islamic reference to two Qur'anic verses (2:143 and 68:28) which allow considerable latitude of interpretation.

116. **Shavit** 2015 traces the official MB doctrine of prudential violence. **Vidino** 2020, 75ff discusses Qaradawi's sometimes coded theorising of this position. As **Cole** 2014, 151 points out, the experience by many ordinary people of AQ and Gal in the region has delegitimised the use of violence even in what they might otherwise view as just causes. But this may not always hold. **Noah Feldman**, *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*, Princeton 2012, 155ff, who is not unsympathetic to political Islamism, writes of "the transnational Muslim Brotherhood... under the slogan, "Islam is the solution",....broadly embracing.. electoral politics, but without eschewing the use of violence in some circumstances..". **Brigitte Maréchal**, *The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse* (tr Jeff Lewis), Brill, Leiden, 2008, 308 remarks, "This historical memory [sc of the MB in Europe] is also reworked as time goes by... events or persons that might compromise the movement are pushed aside. There is a denial of certain violent actions in the past: the Brotherhood presents a whitewashed version of the history of the movement". It is not just Qaradawi who issues fatwas justifying suicide and other attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers: the Saudi *Sahwa* Shaikh, **Ayedh al-Qarni** (usually thought of as close to the MB), has done the same thing. See also **Mostafa Hashem**, *A Generational Battle Among Brothers*, Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 29 January 2015 at <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/58865> who claims the EMB made a generational choice after 2013 to escalate political violence. **Victor J. Willis**, *Phoenix Rising from the Ashes? The Internal State of Affairs of the Muslim Brotherhood at the Start of 2016*, *Al Jadaliyya*, 25 January 2016 at <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/23677/phoenix-rising-from-the-ashes-the-internal-state-o> discusses this trajectory in some detail. For a notorious exemplar – the Yemeni *Islah*/MB leader, **Zindani** – see **Stig Harle Jansen and Atle Mesøy**, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa*, *NIBR Report*, 2009:33 at <http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/ruijah/i-m-e.pdf>, 25ff. There are complex links between him and his former *Islah* colleague, **Abdul Wahhab al Humayqani** – who has been proscribed by the Saudis – and the Qatari, **Abdul Rahman al-Nuaimi**, both also on US terror lists. For a brief commentary on the ideological links between ISIS and the MB see **Jason Burke**, *The Isis Leader's Vision of the State is a Profoundly Contemporary One*, *The Guardian*, 24 August 2014 at

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/24/isis-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-jason-burke>. There is an intriguing parallel between Qaradawi's mild rebukes for those Islamists who adopt violence prematurely and the attitude of members of the *Partito Comunista Italiano* who called *Le Brigate Rosse*, "compagni che sbagliano" – "errant comrades". On this see **Le Brigate Rosse? Semplici compagni che sbagliano** ('The Red Brigades? Simply Misguided Comrades'), *La Rosanera*, 28 September 2013 at <http://www.larosanera.it/le-brigate-rosse-semplici-compagni-che-sbagliano> quoting a former Communist Party Secretary: "Piero Fassino ha onestamente descritto il comportamento del PCI in quegli anni, «a volte, le nostre intenzioni erano confuse. Mentre alcuni compagni pensavano a una congiura di forze reazionarie, in altri la condanna del terrorismo era, come dire? soltanto tattica. Secondo questi ultimi compagni, il terrorista sbagliava unicamente perché la forma di lotta che aveva scelto era "controproducente" e faceva il gioco del padrone. Mancava in molti di noi un giudizio negativo della violenza, da rifiutare sempre, in sé e per sé. E c'erano anche, guai a non riconoscerlo! gruppi sia pure isolati di nostri compagni che dicevano di certe vittime: "Gli sta bene!". Accadde, ad esempio, per il sequestro Amerio. Quest'ultima posizione si esprime nella formula: "I terroristi sono compagni che sbagliano". Lo slogan inverso però per un paio d'anni, fino al 1977, contrapponendosi alla tesi della congiura". The wider comparison with Gramsci is suggestive: see **Brecht de Smet**, *The Prince and the Minotaur: Egypt in the Labyrinth of Counter-Revolution*, *LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 36*, June 2020 at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/events/2019/egypt-in-the-labyrinth-of-counter-revolution>, who in my view correctly identifies the EMB as a counter-revolutionary actor not a Gramscian liberator.

117. On which the classic study is **Hossam Tammam**, *tasalluf al ikhwan: ta'akul al utruhat al ikhwaniiyyah wa su'ud al salafyyah fi jama'at al Ikhwan al muslimin* – 'Salafisation of the MB: Erosion of the MB Thesis and the Rise of Salafism in the MB', *Bibliotheca Alexandrina*, 2011, available in English translation at https://www.bibalex.org/attachments/publications/files/2012072613022217192_mrasedenglish2.pdf.

radicals of our time – from Muhammad Surur Zain al-Abeddin¹¹⁸ through Osama bin Laden¹¹⁹ to Abdullah Azzam,¹²⁰ Abu Mus'ab al-Suri¹²¹ and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.¹²² They advocate or deploy extreme violence not simply to terrorise but as a self-authenticating and publicly performative expression of their ideology.

118. For Surur see *Hassan Hassan (3), Muhammad Surur and the Normalisation of Extremism, The National, 14 November 2016* at <https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/muhammad-surur-and-the-normalisation-of-extremism-1.214695>.

119. On bin Laden see *Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, New York 2006*.

Ahmed Mansour, Al-Jazeera's star interviewer (often seen as sympathetic to the MB), in a notorious interview with the AQ-aligned Jabhat al-Nusra's Abu Muhammad al-Jolani in May 2015 asked him why JaN/AQ didn't just join the MB since their ideologies were so similar and Qutb's thought featured heavily in their Shari'ah training; Jolani admits that the sources of their respective ideologies are the same: see <https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=ahmad+mansour+interviews+al+jolani&qv=ahmad+mansour+interviews+al+jolani&view=detail&mid=4C040EA5661B2C4DA6204C040EA5661B2C4DA620&&FORM=VDRVRV>. *Abu Rumman 2014* and *Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011* at <http://icr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1315827595ICSRPaperAsAmericanAsApplePieHowAnwaralAwlakiBecameTheFaceofWesternJihad.pdf> discuss how the Yemeni AQ leader, Anwar al-Awlaki, was shaped by studying the writings of Sayyid Qutb – whom he venerated – and Yusuf al-Qaradawi and with Salman al-Awda and most particularly the Yemeni Islah leader, Abdul Majid al-Zindani.

120. For Azzam see *Hegghammer 2020* and in general *Muhammad al-'Ubaydi, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton and Bryan Price, The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges Of the Islamic State, The Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, December 2014* at <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-the-evolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state>. *Mubaraz Ahmed, Milo Comerford and Emman El-Badawy, Milestones to Militancy: What the Lives of 100 Jihadis Tell us About a Global Movement, the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, April 2016* at <http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Milestones-to-Militancy.pdf> found 51% of their sample of violent jihadis had a background in the MB and a further 12% in Hamas. They believe this may be an underestimate. There is a data-driven discussion of the intellectual overlap online between various streams of Islamist thought in *Mubaraz Ahmed and Fred Lloyd George, A War of Keywords, The Tony Blair Faith Foundation, April 2016* at <http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/War-of-Keywords.pdf>. For a wider account of how a transition from non-violent to violent extremist might work, see *Lorenzo Vidino, Sharia4: From Confrontational Activism to Militancy, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 9, No 2 (2015)* at <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/415/html>.

121. For al-Suri see *Lia 2014*.

122. For Baghdadi and MB/IS connections more generally see *Burke 2014; Jason Burke, The Rise of al Baghdadi and the Islamic State, Salon, 29 November 2015* at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/24/isis-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-jason-burke>;

Muhammad Sayyid Rassas, Min Hassan al Banna ila Abu Bakr al Baghdadi wa baynahuma akharuna (From Hassan al Banna to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi – and Others in Between), Al Hayat, 26 August 2014, at <http://alhayat.com/Articles/4302508> -

<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/religious-origins-of-islamic-extremism.html>; *Shukur Khilkhal, IS Emerges from Radical Islamic Jurisprudence, Al-Monitor, 12 August 2014* at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/religious-origins-of-islamic-extremism.html>; *Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, Brookings Analysis Paper No 19, March 2015* at <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state-bunzel/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf>; *Ali Hashem, The Many Names of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, Al-Monitor 23 March 2015* at <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/isis-baghdadi-islamic-state-caliph-many-names-al-qaeda.html>; *Hisham Melhem, Keeping up with the Caliphate: an Islamic State for the Internet Age, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015* at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/keeping-caliphate>; and *William McCants, The Believer: How an Introvert with a Passion for Religion and Soccer Became Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, Leader of the Islamic State, Brookings, 1 September 2015* at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever>. For detail on the intertwined genealogies see *A.N., Meet the Badris, Syria Comment, 13 March 2015* at <http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/meet-the-badris/>; *Philippe Gagnabet, Qui est "l'Emir blanc", mentor de djihadistes francais?, Le Monde 25 November 2015* at http://www.lemonde.fr/service/donnees_personnelles.html; and *Christopher Dickey, Is ISIS's Voice of Death Hiding in France? The Daily Beast 22 November 2015* at <https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-isis-voice-of-death-hiding-in-france>, who suggests a connection with Olivier Corel, the alleged mentor of ISIL activists in France. There is an excellent *MediaPart* debate from April 2016 – which covers the relationship between the 'softer' end of ISIL and the 'harder' end of the MB – between *David Thomson (RFI) and Romain Caillet (an independent researcher) moderated by Pierre Puchot (Moyen-Orient Express), 2016: L'Année de la chute de l'État Islamique ("The Year of ISIL's Fall")* at https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/210416/2016-annee-de-la-chute-de-letat-islamique?user_id=177cdda0-c371-4676-baf3-41725becc30a, <https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=IgtG5gGv9mY>. In this context Thomson's book of interviews with returned IS militants, *Les Revenants, Seuil, 2016* is well worth reading, as is *Graeme Wood, The Way of the Strangers New York 2017*. In a grimly fascinating documentary on *Ahrar al Sham* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lydv7dr6qE&feature=youtu.be>, Abdul Nasser al-Yassin, a founding member and commander of AaS's military wing until 9 September 2014, talks about the MB background of his family which led him to AaS. He cites Qutb's *Milestones* as one of the key texts in his journey. Others talk about *Din wa Dawlah* and the key Qutbist concept of *Tamkin*. Hassan About, the original leader, emphasises in the same film the independence of AaS from the MB and other groups. But it is the shared vocabulary and the ideological trajectory that counts.

Islamism and Muslims

Despite all of this, the message of the Brotherhood has been and continues to be seductive for many Muslims. The group's eschatological and self-justifying narratives of conspiracy and righteous suffering represent a claim to privileged knowledge about the real workings of the world that promises to unmask occult forces.¹²³ We see this in the regular use by Islamists of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, or their insistence that it was the US or the Jews who were responsible for 9/11. We see it in the belief widely held among Islamists that the West created the Islamic State. And we see it in their not entirely consistent claims that 'moderate' Islam is also a western plot.

In the face of such diabolical forces, the Brotherhood has remained confident that through divine guidance and Godly endurance it will achieve eventual victory. This is reflected in its theologisation of history, where Islamists such as Hamas can evoke the Battle of Khaybar, the Prophet Muhammad's victory against the Jews of that place in the seventh century, as a harbinger of victory in the present. It is this same faith, too, which informs the Brotherhood's response to the disasters that befell it in Egypt in 1954 and 2013. Its defeats are seen as tests of faith and destined to be overturned.¹²⁴

But it is also important to note that the deadliest enemies of Islamists are often other Muslims. Leave aside President Sisi, Shaikh Muhammad bin Zayed, King Abdullah of Jordan, Shaikh Muhammad bin Zaid, Prince Muhammad bin Salman or other authoritarian Muslim rulers whom Islamists and their allies stigmatise. Consider those ordinary Muslims or former Muslims who regularly and at some cost speak out against the excesses and presumptions of Islamists, which they see as tarnishing the name of Islam.¹²⁵ They do not deny that Islamists are also Muslim: to do so would be to fall into the very trap Islamists have set, that of *takfir*, the denunciation of other Muslims as infidel, which casts them out of the community and exposes them to mortal danger.¹²⁶ Historically, this anathema – like the declaration of heresy – tended to be reserved for extreme situations and often only reluctantly deployed.¹²⁷ Many Islamists on the other hand take their lead from Qutb, who declared that all existing Muslim societies – and by implication their rulers and those living there -- were effectively un-

123. See *Jean-Pierre Filiu, Apocalypse in Islam, University of California Press, 2012.*

124. For the MB's theologisation of history see for example *Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010, 213 and 274*; and *Michaël Béchir Ayari, Ennahda and the Test of Power (2011-2013) (delivered at John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding and IISS Workshop on The Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Spring, London, 9-11 September 2013): "The problem was that Islamic contestation was not dead and the Arab Spring made lots of Islamists believe that these quasi world-wide-scale changes were a kind of divine sign, reviving Islamic millenarianism" – English slightly adapted). Ashour 2015* quotes a military supporter of the 2011 revolution: "They believe that if they have patience.... God is going to intervene last minute to save them as a result of their patience".

125. An instructive example is Egypt where the anti-Islamist *tamarrud* movement succeeded in 2013 in putting millions of mostly pious Muslims on the streets to protest against the then EMB-dominated government. The success of the anti-MB forces would not have been possible, for all the efforts of certain influential figures and external funding, without substantial domestic support, based on rational assessments of the MB's competence and not unreasonable fears about their intentions, from ordinary Egyptians and the institutions of state. *Kandil 2015* is excellent on this phenomenon. Other examples are the Algerian writer, Kamel Daoud, forced to spend much of his life in exile in France because of threats from Islamists, and indeed the anti-Islamist Bangladeshi bloggers who have paid with their lives in recent years for daring to criticise Islamist extremism in their own country. See *US-Bangladesh blogger Avijit Roy hacked to death, BBC News 27 February 2015* at <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-31656222>; and *Jason Burke and Saad Hammadi, Bangladesh blogger killed by machete gang had asked for police protection, The Guardian, 7 August 2015* at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/07/machete-gang-kills-secular-bangladeshi-blogger-niloy-chakrabarti>.

126. As with Nasr Abou Zaid and Farag Foda in Egypt in the 1980s. *Ghatts 2020* is excellent on these cases, as is *Ajami 1998*.

127. On the whole subject see *Camilla Adang, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro and Sabine Schmidtke, Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic Perspective on Takfir, Brill, 2016* and Lahoud 2010. For a more political perspective see, for example, *Roy 1999, 41-2* and *Gilles Kepel, Away from Chaos: The Middle East and the Challenge to the West, Columbia 2020, 13 and 211*. The original *takfir* were the *Khawarij*, a group of warriors in early Islam who seceded – "kharaju" – from the forces of the Prophet's son-in-law and eventual fourth Caliph Ali when he resorted to arbitration to resolve a conflict over the succession. It is they who coined the phrase "*la hukma illa li-illahi*" – "judgement/dominion belongs to God alone", the ultimate origin of the doctrine of "*hakimiyya*", promoted by Mawdudi and Qutb. See Lahoud 2010 27ff and *Encyclopedia of Islam sv*. The term *Khawarij* was applied to groups of dissidents in the Islamic Middle Ages (there is a lintel inscription preserved inside Qal'at Nimrud, the citadel of the great Mamluk Sultan, Baibars, in the Golan Heights, where the term is paired with "*mutammariduuna*" – "rebels") and by critics to the MB as early as 1948 (*Mitchell 1993, 320*). It is now often used to describe jihadists like Al Qaeda and its offshoots – sometimes by themselves. Ayman Al Zawahiri, for example, stigmatized ISIL as *Khawarij* in an audio recording on 8 May 2016: see *Sam Heller, Al-Qaeda's Al-Zawahiri Plays Politics, RFERL 22 May 2016* at <http://www.rferl.org/content/al-qaeda-al-zawahiri-plays-politics/27746829.html>. *Takfir* is largely but not exclusively Sunni. It seems occasionally to have been used among Shia communities too, often to stigmatise rival Shia groups, even allegedly in the earliest days and then, for example, by the late C18th/early C19th Usuli mujtahids, Wahid Behbehani and Muhammad al Tabataba'i, against Akhbaris and Sufis: see *Zackary M. Heern, Usuli Shi'ism: The Emergence of an Islamic Reform Movement in Early Modern Iraq and Iran, PhD Dissertation submitted to the Department of History, University of Utah, 2011, 67, 79 and 106* at http://bahai-library.com/pdf/h/heern_usuli_shiism-hidden.pdf. *Devji 50f* seeks to modify our understanding of this self-ascription by locating it in a world of floating signifiers.

Islamic. It is an accusation they deploy with gay abandon.¹²⁸

Islamism in the West

Historically, through its critique of European colonialism in the Middle East and North Africa and its championing of an Islamic Caliphate, the MB developed wider ambitions. This started with expansion inside the region but also into Islamic-majority regions in the Horn of Africa and the Balkans.¹²⁹ Then, largely as an unplanned consequence of Nasser's repression after 1954 and the subsequent flight of many senior figures into exile in the West, it developed an international network outside the Arab and Islamic worlds, including branches in the US and Europe, notably Germany, Switzerland, France and the UK.¹³⁰ This gave impressive resilience to the existing Brotherhood model and added new fields of expansion, particularly among the growing communities of Arab and other Muslims in Europe and the US. In 1963 the MB sought to formalise its presence in Europe with the establishment in Germany of a secretariat under a senior Syrian MB figure, Issam al-Attar. Simultaneously, a prominent Egyptian exile, Yusuf Nada, built a complex personal, business and banking network from his base

128. Its contemporary salience undoubtedly comes from Qutb. Even if he actually never uses the word itself, *takfir* is the logical corollary of his claim that morally corrupt and illegitimate Muslim regimes and those willing to work with them could be deemed apostate and worthy of death. It is already present but with limited application in the thought of the C13th scholar Ibn Taimiyya, perhaps the most important precursor of what is now commonly known as Salafism. Qutb's ideas grew out of seeds planted by al Banna. The writings of Mawdudi, have circulated in MB study groups. His ideas about the absolute sovereignty of God ("hakimiyya") led him to anathematise any system of popular sovereignty, including parliamentary democracy, as a blasphemous innovation: see *Nasr 1996* and *Philip Jenkins, Clerical Terror: The roots of jihad in India, The New Republic, December 9, 2008* at <http://www.lebanonwire.com/0812MLN/08120913TNR.asp> and *Aaron Zelin, Socio-political Background and Intellectual Undergirding of the Ikhwanī Breakaway Factions: 1954-1981, The Washington Institute, August 2013* at <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Zelin20130820-Jihadology-BrotherhoodBreakaway.pdf>. According to *Ahmed and George, 2016*, there are almost 4500 monthly searches for Qutb in each of KSA and Egypt. The IS Shari'ah ideologue of Bahraini origin, the late Turki Albin'ali, in his laudatory *sirah* (pious biography) of Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (the No 2 and chief spokesman of IS, killed by a US air strike in late August 2016) reveals that Qutb's *In the Shades of the Quran* was a key text in his intellectual development: see <https://justpaste.it/Adnanibio>. *Mohammad Abu Rumman, I Am A Salafi: A Study of the Actual and Imagined Identities of Salafis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2014* at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ammen/10938.pdf> provides numerous examples of how Qutb's writings have been transformative in the individual trajectories of *haraki* and *jihadi* Salafis. See also *Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam, 2020, 250* and *Esposito and Shahin 2013, 166*, "Even non-violence prone Muslims have been influenced by Qutb's ideas in important ways.... That influence will mainly exert itself in circles where emotional commitment trumps analytical argumentation." *Brigitte Maréchal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe, Leiden 2008, 104ff* discusses the reception of Qutb's ideas by and their continuing relevance to the MB in Europe.
129. Al-Banna established an active *Section for Liaison with the Islamic World* almost from the start. It was designed to propagate the MB's message internationally and build networks of influence: *Mitchell, 1993, 172-74*. There is a quick but informative survey of the MB's branches in the Arab World in *Kandil 2015, Chapter 5. Altman 2009* is also very useful. The collection of papers on *Rethinking Political Islam, POMEPS, August 2015* at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2015/08/rethinking-political-islam> with the reflections of *Jacob Olidort and Raphael Lefevre, Rethinking how we rethink political Islam: A conversation, Brookings, 21 April 2016* at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2016/03/rethinking-political-islam-olidort> give historical depth, the recent context and a sense of the complexity of these issues. *Jansen and Mesøy 2009* are good on Yemen and the Horn of Africa. There is evidence of an MB presence in Bahrain and Djibouti as early as 1937. For Bahrain in general see Ghassan al Shihabi, *البحرين: فلسفة وأيديولوجية الإخوان المسلمون* (*Ikhwan al Bahrain: khususiat al falsafa wa mustaqbal al hirak: 'The MB of Bahrain: The Particulars of their Philosophy and the Future of their Activism'*), *Al Jazeera Studies Centre, 10 June 2014* at <http://studies.aljazeera.net/reports/2014/06/2014061062637721417.htm>. There is a useful summary of the evolving position since 1946 in Syria by *Thomas Pierret, The Syrian Baath Party and Sunni Islam: Conflicts and Convivance, Crown Centre for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, Middle East Brief No 77, February 2014* at <http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB77.pdf>. For Islamisms of all sorts in Lebanon and Syria, including the MB branches founded respectively in 1964 and 1946, see *Gary C Gambill, Islamist Groups in Lebanon, MERIA, Vol 11 No 4, (December 2007)* at <http://www.rubincenter.org/meria/2007/12/Gambill.pdf> and *Syria, American Foreign Policy Council, World Almanac of Islamism, July 2016* at http://almanac.afpc.org/sites/almanac.afpc.org/files/Syria%202016%20Update%20Website_0.pdf. For MB antecedents to the rise of jihadi groups in the Horn of Africa and more widely on the continent, see *Guido Sternberg and Annette Weber, Jihadism in Africa, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Research Paper 5, June 2015* at http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2015_RP05_sbg_web.pdf. For North Africa see for example ICG, *Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History, 20 April 2004* at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/egypt/islamism-north-africa-i-legacies-history>. *Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Ithaca 1998, 154ff* adds some interesting detail. For the Balkans, see *J Millard Burr, The Balkans, Bosnia and the Muslim Brotherhood, The Cutting Edge, October 9, 2012* at <http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=76456>: it is pro-Serb but seems factually correct - Alia Iztbegovic was a key figure. On the international MB in general, see *Hussam Tammam, الإخوان المسلمون: من التنظيم إلى الحركة (Al Tanzim al Duwaliyy lil Ikhwan..Al Wa'd wal Masirat wal Mal: "The IMB: Promise, Trajectory and Wealth")*, *Al Hiwar al Mutamadnan, 20 September 2004* at <http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=23729>. For the attempts by the MB to impose central control over these disparate branches, see *الإخوان المسلمون: من التنظيم إلى الحركة (Muhammad Habib, Haqiqat "al tanzeem al duwaliyy" lil Ikhwan: "The Reality of the IMB")*, *El Watan, 5 November 2013* at <https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/351277> and *Muhammad Musa'ad al Arabi الإخوان المسلمون: من التنظيم إلى الحركة: سؤال وجواب (Muhammad Musa'ad al Arabi, Baina al Wataniiyyah wal Umumiyyah ("The Question of the MB's International Organisation: Between Nationalism and Internationalism"), Mominoun Without Borders, 28 December 2017* at <http://www.mominoun.com/articles/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-1438>. *Pargeter 2013, 105* onwards describes the International MB in general and the determination of the newly released EMB leadership after 1970 to bring other country branches under the control of the Murshid by swearing *bay'at*. Mustafa Mashour and Muhammad al-Akef, the fifth and seventh Murshids respectively, were instrumental in this: see also *Kandil 2015, 3254*.
130. On this process and the MB's subsequent trajectory in Europe and the US *Vidino 2010* and *Frampton 2018* are fundamental. *Karoui 2018, Part III* is a very helpful account of the same topic covering all varieties of Islamism, from the MB, through Salafisms to jihadism and the activities of Turkish groups. There is a brief but interesting discussion of the MB's international strategy in the 1980s and 1990s in *Maréchal 2008, 35-53*. It has always been historically contingent. See also *Nathan Brown and Amr Hamzawy, Between Religion and Politics, Carnegie Institute Washington 2010*.

in Lugano, Switzerland.¹³¹ There was a similar trajectory in the US.¹³²

Muslim Brothers and other Islamists had established themselves in the UK,¹³³ Germany and Austria by the early 1960s. And Europe became an important base for the MB's growing global networks from the 1970s onwards. After the release of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) leadership by Sadat, they re-established their governing structures at a meeting in Mecca and regrouped with others in London in 1973 to establish the Islamic Centre of Europe (ICE). More recently we have seen the creation by the MB-linked Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE) of the Dublin-based European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR: with a parallel Fiqh Council in North America, both of which have links with the Doha-based International Union of Islamic Scholars) which treats European Muslims as a single Islamic community.¹³⁴

The MB's international network is a vehicle for the promotion of its distinct ideology, attracting many who are not formally members of the MB. Indeed, outside of Muslim-majority countries the question of whether there is an extensive, formal membership has remained shrouded in ambiguity. As a recent book makes clear, this has been a deliberate choice on the part of activists who have preferred to operate in secrecy.¹³⁵

131. For Issam al-Attar, who was the leader of the SMB from around 1964 until he was exiled, see *Maréchal 2008, 157; Pargeter 2013, 116f;* and *Lefèvre 2013, 85ff and 113*. Al-Banna's son-in-law, Said Ramadan (the father of Tariq) was instrumental in the spread of the MB in Europe and the US – where he knew Malcolm X – latterly from his base in Geneva, where he established a highly influential Islamic Centre. For a fully worked and instructive example of how it was done, see *Guido Steinberg Germany and the Muslim Brotherhood in Lorenzo Vidino (ed), The West and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring, Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre in collaboration with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2013 at <https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/04/the-west-and-the-muslim-brotherhood-after-the-arab-spring/>*. Ramadan was saved from imprisonment in Egypt in late 1954 by being out of the country at an MB meeting in Damascus, from where a regional MB position on the EMB's proscription was coordinated: *Mitchell, 141*. He was a close associate of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the former Mufti of Jerusalem notorious to many for his relationship with Hitler. He also knew Mawduudi from his time in Pakistan in the late 1940s/early 1950s. For a detailed account see *Ian Johnson, A Mosque in Munich, Boston/New York 2010*; and *Stefan Meining, Eine Moschee in Deutschland: Nazis, Geheimdienste und der Aufstieg der politischen Islam im Westen, (A Mosque in Germany: Nazis, Secret Services and the Rise of Political Islam in the West)*, Kindle Edition, Munich 2011 with a parallel documentary, 'Zwischen Halbmond und Hakenkreuz' ('Between the Crescent and the Swastika') available in five parts on YouTube; *Steven Brooke's* chapter on relations between the MB and the US in *Vidino (ed) 2013. Robert Dreyfuss, The Devil's Game: How the US Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam* is a rather over-written read covering some of the same material. There is a brief account of Ramadan's life, *Les Frères Musulmans: Politique de Rabbaniyya: Les Prières avant le Pouvoir ('The MB: The Politics of Theology: Prayers before Power)*, by M H Faruqi at <http://www.cige.org/cige/historique.html>. *Maréchal 2008, 56ff and 135ff* is more sympathetic than most to Ramadan, though describes much the same trajectory. Ramadan, Attar and Yusuf Nada were closely associated, alongside Muhammad Mahdi Akef, the seventh EMB Murshid, with the important Aachen and Munich mosques in Germany. They "made use of civil liberties to develop the international structures of the MB" – *Steinberg, 88*. They also obtained valuable tax-free status. Attar was accused of allowing the Aachen Islamic Centre to be used as a command centre for the Syrian MB's campaign of violence against the regime of Hafez al-Assad in the late 1970s. His wife was assassinated in 1981 by Syrian government agents: *Lefèvre 2113, 113* and *Karl Binswanger: Fundamentalisten-Filz - Getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen* in *Bahman Nirumand (ed.): Im Namen Allahs: Islamische Gruppen und der Fundamentalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Köln: Dreisam 1990, 129-148*. "The Munich Islamic Centre would...grow into a national organization, send shoots across the Atlantic and lay the cornerstone for European organizations that endure today, ensuring that the Brotherhood's version of Islam would come to be the most influential one in the West", *Johnson 2010, 187*. Khurshid Ahmad of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Indo-Pakistani analogue of the MB, was also involved. For Nada see *Vidino 2010, 27ff and 78ff; Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan, The Social Affairs Unit 2008, 121ff;* and *Sylvain Besson, La vie secrète de Youssef Nada, ambassadeur de l'ombre des Frères musulmans, Le Temps, 20 November 2002 at <https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/vie-secrete-youssef-nada-ambassadeur-lombre-freres-musulmans>*. He makes the case for his own defence in *Youssef Nada with Douglas Thompson, Inside the Muslim Brotherhood, London 2012*. There is a highly illuminating interview with him conducted by the network's then star presenter, Ahmad Mansour, *يوسف نادا: من قال لنا اننا فاسدون ('Yusuf Nada: The Coup in Egypt will Founder on the Army')*, *Al Jazeera, 16 April 2014 at <https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/withoutbounds/2014/4/16/%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%81-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D9-%83%D8%B3%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84>*. One distinctive feature of the MB's international networks is the depth of the personal relationships involved, often through intermarriage (one of Nada's daughters, for example, is married to a son of Yusuf al-Qaradawi; another is married to the son of Issam al-Attar; Ibrahim al-Zayat, the two-term head of the Islamic Society of Germany, is married to a niece of Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of modern Turkish Islamism: *Vidino 2010, 46*).

132. See *al Arabi 2017*, and *Steven Merley, The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, The Hudson Institute, 1 April 2009 at <https://hudson.org/research/9880-the-muslim-brotherhood-in-the-united-states>* and *Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe, and Laurie Cohen, A rare look at secretive Brotherhood in America*, *Chicago Tribune, September 19, 2004*, at <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-0409190261sep19-story.html>.

133. Where the Muslim Student Society, the Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS) and Jamaat-e-Islami's UK Islamic Mission were all established by 1963: see *The Cordoba Foundation 2013, 35ff*. In practice coordination between different groups has sometimes been problematic. There is an interesting insight into how this works – or doesn't – in *Mohammed Amin Resigns from the MCB, Inayat's Corner, 22 June 2010 at <https://inayatscorner.wordpress.com/2010/06/22/mohammed-amin-resigns-from-the-mcb/>*, responding to *Madeleine Bunting, The MCB's Wonderland Election, The Guardian, 18 June 2010 at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jun/18/the-mcbs-wonderland-election>*.

134. See *Vidino. 2010 58ff and Prazan 2014 2816ff. Ian Johnson, Islamic Justice Finds a Foothold in Heart of Europe, The Wall Street Journal, 4 August 2004* is also helpful. At a meeting in Yusuf Nada's Lugano base in 1977 the IMB – including Qaradawi, Anwar Ibrahim and Khurshid Ahmad – set up the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT), designed specifically to promote Islam in western countries: *Vidino 2010, 72* and *Prazan 2014, 2964 ff*. The Brussels-based Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), which became the most significant of all these bodies, emerged from the same milieu. There was a similar trajectory in the US (where the IIIT eventually also operated) – reportedly with greater independence from the EMB – doubtless because the key movers were three Iraqi Kurds. By the 1980s there were a North American Islamic Trust, a Muslim Student Association and an Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), all reportedly under MB control. The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) was founded in the US in 1994 from the same root stock. See *Vidino 2010, 72ff; al Arabi, 2017, 8f; Merley 2009;* and *Ahmed-Ullah, Roe, and Cohen 2004*. For the CEF, the International Union of Muslim Scholars (also inaugurated by Qaradawi in London in 2004) and the IIIT, see *Maréchal 2008, 75-6*. The MB is not the only representative of Islam in Europe, of course. *Tammam 2004* is foundational on the history of the International Guidance Council, the IMB as a whole, its antecedents under Hassan al-Banna, the importance of personalities and its changing shape. *Vidino 2010, 81f* remarks, "Most notably, the Brotherhood is also a global ideological movement in which like-minded individuals interact through an informal yet very sophisticated international network of personal, financial and especially ideological ties. Mohammed Akef, the former EMB Murshid, describes it as "a global movement whose members cooperate with each other throughout the world, based on the same religious worldview – the spread of Islam until it rules the world". *Vidino 2010, 92 ff* and *Ramsauer Chapter 6* are good on the MB networks of common membership of the boards of companies, associations and other organisations that have proliferated over the past 45 years; or through the regular international Islamism circuit of pilgrimages, conferences and meetings. More broadly, "Sociologists of diffusion have long shown that the best way to transmit an item is direct face-to-face ties. Drawing on this basic idea, scholars interested in the transnational diffusion of political ideas and forms of action reached the conclusion that, even in an era of mass-media, what they call 'relational diffusion' remains the most effective vehicle for the spreading of ideas across national borders", *Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics, London 2008, 103* with the further references to the academic literature. The impact varies according to circumstances.

135. L. Vidino, *The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020).

Still, the MB has long been an effective and disciplined communicator, through books, cassettes, magazines, and local TV channels. But satellite channels, websites and social media have enabled the MB, like other Islamist groups, to project a presence and message internationally in ways barely imaginable 30 years ago. The best example is, of course, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian Islamist preacher and jurist given citizenship in Qatar over 30 years ago.¹³⁶

And where the MB paved the way, other Islamists followed, including: South Asian movements such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Tablighi Jamaat; Iranian-backed Shia movements;¹³⁷ and now the Turkish *diyanet*. Several developed in parallel with the Brotherhood, and there were moments of cross-fertilisation. Some, for instance, have roots in movements that originated in nineteenth century British India (Deobandism or Ahl-e-Hadith) and which helped shape what became the MB. For obvious reasons the South Asian groups tend to be more visible in the UK and their Turkish counterparts in Germany and Austria. There are also Kurdish Islamist movements in Denmark and

136. Qaradawi's relationship to the MB is complex. He was reportedly offered the post of *Murshid* more than once but has preferred to maintain an apparently independent platform while expanding his influence within the MB internationally. He was excluded from the UK in 2008. See in general *Bettina Graef and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, The Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, London 2009* particularly the contribution by *Hussam Tammam, Yusuf al Qaradawi and The Muslim Brothers: The Nature of a Special Relationship*, at 55ff and *Vidino 2010, 98ff*. There is an interesting critique of Graef and Skovgaard-Petersen for ignoring Qaradawi's intolerance by *Khaled Hroub, Al Qaradawi ist kein Symbol der islamischen Toleranz, Die Welt, 2 October 2010* at <https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article6435289/Al-Qaradawi-ist-kein-Symbol-islamischer-Toleranz.html>. See also *Martyn Frampton and Shiraz Maher Between 'Engagement' and a 'Values-Led' Approach: Britain and the Muslim Brotherhood from 9/11 to the Arab Spring*. Qaradawi's appearance on 20 February 2011 to lead communal prayers in Cairo's Tahrir Square was symbolic. He had been banned from doing so in Egypt after 1981. On his triumphant return he was flanked by the EMB leadership. *Ranko 2014, 1185* remarks that he "gilt als internationale Leitfigur für den Islamismus als transnationale Bewegung" ("counts as a leading international figure of transnational Islam"). But this aroused misgivings too, with some comparing his return to that of Khomeini to Tehran in 1979 after 14 years in exile. Satellite Salafism, often Saudi-inspired, is also popular. This represents competition and also reinforcement for the MB: for example the Saudi Salafi Shaikh, with a massive following on Twitter, Mohammad al-Arifi (excluded from the UK in 2013 and often in trouble with the Saudi authorities) has frequently tweeted in support of the EMB. See *Khalil al Anani, Pious Way to Politics: The Rise of Political Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt, Digest of Middle East Studies, Volume 22, Issue 1, 16 April 2013* at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dome.12012/pdf>, *Nathan Field and Ahmed Hamam, Salafi Satellite TV in Egypt, Arab Media and Society, Issue 8, Spring 2009* at <http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=712>, *Alexandra Siegel, Viral Pulpits: Clerics and the Sectarianization of the Gulf Online Sphere, POMEPS, 28 October 2016* at <https://pomeps.org/2017/01/09/viral-pulpits-clerics-and-the-sectarianization-of-the-gulf-online-sphere/> and *Tuve Floden, Defining the Media Du'ā and Their Call to Action, POMEPS, 28 October 2016* at <http://pomeps.org/2017/01/06/defining-the-media-dua-and-their-call-to-action/>. *Maréchal 2008, 69ff* and *147ff* discusses the MB outreach strategy in Europe and Qaradawi respectively. Qaradawi's views on Islam and democracy are at *Euben and Zaman, Chapter 9*, with a helpful commentary, teasing out the many ambiguities.

137. The cell-based and highly sectarian Da'wa party arose in the late 1950s from clerical circles in Najaf, in many ways as a Shia version of the MB. The fullest and best treatment of the subject is by *Jabar 2003*. See also *Joel Wing, A History of Iraq's Islamic Dawa Party, With Lowy Inst. for Intl. Policy's Dr Rodger Shanahan, Musings on Iraq Blogspot, 13 August 2012* at <https://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2012/08/a-history-of-iraqs-islamic-dawa-party.html>. *Roy 2010, 208ff* and *Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, London 1992, 16ff* offer some reflections on the globalisation and deculturation of radical Shia politics and *Devji 54ff* on the Sunni and Shia poles of political Islamism. Al-Banna and especially Sayyid Qutb cross sectarian boundaries. In an extraordinary interview with the then Iraqi PM, Nouri al-Maliki – *Adel al Toraifi, Asharq Al-Awsat Interview: Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, Al Sharq al Awsat, 12 February 2013* at <https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/adel-al-toraifi/interviews/asharq-al-awsat-interview-iraqi-prime-minister-nuri-al-maliki> – he referenced Qutb and his brother, Muhammad, Fahmi Howeiidi and Muhammad Amara, all MB-related Islamists (the former a member of Qaradawi's International Union of Muslim Scholars – <http://iumsonline.org/ar/>) and the MB-affiliated former Kuwaiti MP, Abdullah al-Nafisi. See also the excellent profile of Maliki by *Dexter Filkins, What We Left Behind, The New Yorker, 28 April 2014* at <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28/what-we-left-behind>, *Kasra Aarabi, Beyond Borders: the Expansionist Ideology of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 4 February 2020* at <https://institute.global/policy/beyond-borders-expansionist-ideology-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps> for a detailed study of the ideological indoctrination of the IRGC – and by extension of all Hezbollahi movements, very similar to analogous Sunni trends (including adoption of the key concepts of *jahiliyyah* and *hakimiyyah*): *Jabar 257*; and also – for Hezbollah/EMB relations – *Al-Monitor, Morsi's Ouster Leaves Hezbollah Uncertain about Egypt Ties, Al-Monitor, 9 July 2013* at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/hezbollah-unsure-morsi-ouster-egypt.html>. The founder of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fathi Shikaki "joined the Muslim Brotherhood movement together with a group of Palestinian students and was influenced by the ideas of its principal thought leaders, Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, though he was also drawn to the ideology of Shiite thinkers Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. With the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979, before PIJ was established, Shikaki published his book "Khomeini – The Islamic Solution and the Alternative," in which he expressed his support for Khomeini, the "philosopher and warrior." In the book, Shikaki quotes a fatwa of Khomeini that states that the effort to destroy Israel is a religious duty. Shikaki called for Shiite-Sunni cooperation, and mentioned the 1959 fatwa of Sheikh Al-Azhar Mahmud Shaltut, according to which the Twelver Shia is a legitimate branch of Islam. On this basis, in his book Shikaki laid the ideological foundation for the relationship between Khomeini-led Iran and the Palestinians, pointing out that Khomeini had expressed to Yasser Arafat his support for a joint armed struggle against their common enemy, Israel." *Dr Yossi Mansharof, The Relationship Between Iran and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, JISS, 27 February 2020* at <https://jiss.org.il/en/mansharof-the-relationship-between-iran-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad/>. Shikaki was dismissed from the MB as a result. But the episode reveals an ideological relationship analogous to that of Maliki and the MB. The late Lebanese Shia cleric, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, wrote, "There can be no religion without politics as religious values are not suspended in the air, but rather live in the mind, heart, and movement of the human being. In fact, they reflect reality. That's why our religion is politics and our politics is religion": *Tariq Azizah, The Authoritarian Roots of Contemporary Islamist Discourse, The Arab Reform Initiative, 15 November 2017* at http://www.arab-reform.net/en/advanced-search-2?search_api_fulltext=The+Authoritarian+Roots+of+Contemporary+Islamist+Discourse++paper%2C+researcher+tariq+azizah+argues. Hassan al-Banna would have agreed. There was an earlier link between the Muslim Brotherhood and the violently radical Shia group, Feda'iyan-e-Islam (Fel), headed by Navab-e-Safavi (a *nom de guerre*). See *Prazan 2013, Mitchell 1993, 126; Baqer Moin, Khomeini, Life of the Ayatollah, I.B.Tauris 1999, 59-60 and 223-4; James Buchan, Days of God, John Murray, London 2012 (Kindle Edition), 2226-2260; Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, Oxford 2000, 105, 131* (interesting on the shared focus on Palestine), *325 and 382; Prazan 2014, 1813ff, Frampton 2018, 321; Ghattas 2020, 35* and four-part series of articles by *Amir al-Taheri, 'Iran wal Ikhwān: al Judhur al idiyulujjya lil sharakā' ('Iran and the MB: The Ideological Roots of Partnership'), Al Sharq al Awsat, 28 – 31 May 2014*. Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani, close to the Shia Fanonist, Ali Shariati, and also accused of sheltering Safavi, was a participant in the MB-organised series of conferences on Palestine in Jerusalem that ended in 1962. Ayatollah Khalkhali, Khomeini's pet executioner, had been a member of Fel. Yusuf Nada, the Lugano-based businessman and financier, in the remarkable *Mansour 2014* claimed close personal links with Iran since 1979. There is an enlightening earlier interview too: see *Ghattas 2020, 29*. There were MB-led demonstrations in favour of the Iranian Revolution in Jordan and elsewhere in 1979. The Iranian revolutionary regime put Sayyid Qutb and Safavi on postage stamps. Khomeini is said to have met Mawdudi in Mecca in 1963 and subsequently translated his works into Persian: *Ghattas 2020, 43-44*. Ayatollah Khamenei translated Qutb (*Dexter Filkins, The Twilight of the Iranian Republic, The New Yorker, 25 May 2020* at <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/the-twilight-of-the-iranian-revolution-is-enlightening-on-this-and-his-wider-views>). These links seem to have been maintained at least into the 1980s: *Maréchal 2008, 46*. The founder of what became the AKP in Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan, was a great admirer of Khomeini and the relationship between Turkish and Iranian Islamisms has developed in interestingly complex ways: see *Suleyman Ozeren, Saat Cubukcu & Matthew Bastug, Where Will Erdogan's Revolution Stop? The Hudson Institute, 3 February 2020* at <https://www.hudson.org/research/15682-where-will-erdogan-s-revolution-stop>

Sweden.¹³⁸

Initially the focus for Brotherhood exiles was simply on using Europe as a base to regroup after the disasters of the 1950s in Egypt. And their focus remained the Arab world. But as they became more settled and interacted with other groups, and as Muslim migration into Europe accelerated, new opportunities arose to shape politics in the countries of settlement.

This has produced a new landscape of Islamist politics in the West, populated by a wide variety of different actors, sometimes competing, sometimes cooperating. They have transferred the turbulent and contestatory politics of Muslim-majority polities, where the goal is to capture power in order to make governance more Islamic (as they define it), to the very different terrain of the western secular state. The aim is to carve out space for the expansion of an activist Islamist movement, which they hope will shape the secular polity in ways that both bolster and confirm their authority as agents of divinely-sanctioned change.¹³⁹

And yet, despite their pretensions, many of these actors are not religious scholars and pursue wholly temporal ambitions. In this sense, someone like Qaradawi is an outlier. His scholarly credentials are not typical of the average Islamist activist, who instead is likely to be a member of the professional lower middle-class and operates within the framework of a secular (with a small 's') organisation, which purports to speak for a faith bloc. Their goals are social and political before they are theological.

They act as privileged gatekeepers, both to a constructed 'Muslim' community, which they claim the right to define and represent, and to an Islamic tradition they claim the right to interpret.¹⁴⁰ In so doing, they seek to mobilise Muslims behind an agenda of communalism, sustained by a narrative of grievance and victimhood, in the service of an ideology that at its heart contests the legitimate foundations of the modern western state.¹⁴¹ That

138. The literature on these movements is vast. See for example *Mandaville 2007*; *Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam, Columbia University Press 2020* and *Holy Ignorance, London 2010*; *Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, 2006* and *Terreur dans L'Hexagone: Genèse du Jihad Français, Gallimard, 2017*; *Innes Bowen, Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam, London 2014* and most recently *Damon L. Perry, The Islamic Movement in Britain, ICSR 2020* at <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ICSR-Report-The-Islamic-Movement-in-Britain.pdf>. The *diyanet* is essentially the proselytising wing of the Turkish state. It has acquired a new political reach under the AKP government: see for example *David Lepeska, Turkey's Erdoğan squeezes critics in Germany, poisoning integration, Ahval News, 21 August 2020* at <https://ahvalnews.com/german-turks/turkeys-erdogan-squeezes-critics-germany-poisoning-integration> and *Damien McLroy, Turkey provides base for '20,000 Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood' supporters, The National 21 August 2020* at <https://www.thenational.ae/world/turkey-provides-base-for-20-000-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-supporters-1.1065871>. The AKP sprang from the Millî Görüş or National View Movement. Like the Gülen movement, it was influenced by the thought of Said Nursi, a contemporary of al-Banna with whom he shared many views: see *Mucahit Bilici, 'Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen: The Rise and Fall of Post-Nurcu Messianism in Turkey', Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies, George Mason University, 20 October 2016* at <https://islamicstudiescenter.gmu.edu/events/6333> and *Claire Berlinski, Who Is Fethullah Gülen? City Journal, Autumn 2012* at <https://www.city-journal.org/html/who-fethullah-g%C3%BClen-13504.html>. In common with the MB it has always had strongly anti-Jewish/anti-Zionist (often indistinguishable) sentiments, hence perhaps its consistent support for Hamas: see *Jonathan Schanzer, Hamas Still Finds Harbor in Turkey, Foundation for Defense of Democracy, 8 June 2016* at <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/schanzer-jonathan-hamas-still-finds-harbor-in-turkey/> and *Joby Warrick, Double Game? Even as it Battles ISIS, Turkey Gives Other Extremists Shelter, The Washington Post, 10 July 2016* at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/double-game-even-as-it-battles-isis-turkey-gives-other-extremists-shelter/2016/07/10/8d6ce040-4053-11e6-a66f-aa6c1883b6b1_story.html?utm_term=.01daf63ed458. There is an expansive account of the Islamist ideological contest in Turkey and its political implications by *Senem Aslan, Different Faces of Turkish Islamic Nationalism, Monkey Cage, The Washington Post, 20 February 2015* at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/20/different-faces-of-turkish-islamic-nationalism/?utm_term=.e7616269fc50 and an account of the connectivity between Gülen and the AKP by *Dexter Filkins, Turkey's Thirty-Year Coup, The New Yorker, 17 October 2016* at <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/17/turkeys-thirty-year-coup>: a good discursive analysis of the AKP by *Christopher de Bellaigue, Welcome to Demokrasi: How Erdogan Got More Popular Than Ever, The Guardian, 30 August 2016* at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/welcome-to-demokrasi-how-erdogan-got-more-popular-than-ever>; and an intriguing piece on relations between the Jordanian MB and the AKP by *Dr Salah al Obaidi, تويون واخ اتادايوي: عم دادستدا انل (ي لقرتلا في جناتلا او قل اداعل) - ي أرلا قضي حص - (Qiyadat Ikhwanīya: lina imtidād ma'ā' al 'ada'lat wa al tanmiyat al turki: "MB Leadership: We have a connection with the Turkish AKP")*, *A Ra'i*, 1 December 2015 at <http://alrai.com/article/752671.html>. The German, Dutch and Austrian governments in particular – with their large communities of Turkish origin – have become particularly concerned with the implications of the spread of state-sponsored Turkish ethno-nationalist Islamism.

139. Something explicitly stated by the leaders of such movements: *Perry 2020* has numerous examples. The process of carving out space for this endeavour is often referred to as "*tamkeen*" – a key concept in Islamist discourse, derived from Sayyid Qutb. *Mbaye Lo, Political Islam, Justice and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018* explains it thus: *The phrase "roadmap to the Islamic state" might capture what Qutb postulated as tamkeen. It is a metaphor for his scattered views in Fi Zilal al-Quran, a category of tafsir (Quranic exegeses) that engages the Quran as a roadmap from our jahili society to a hakimiyyah society. Following the assassination of Sadat and the aggressive tactics employed by the government of President Hosni Mubarak to dislodge sympathizers of Islamic jihad from Egypt and prosecute Islamists, tamkeen became the strategic plan for the Islamist movement. The corpus that developed around this idea became known as fiqh al-nasr wa tamkeen or, in its short term, fiqh tamkeen (empowerment)...In the 1970s and the 1980s, Qutb's brother Muhammed Qutb carried the torch of the idea of tamkeen. His commentary on the process of tamkeen had the most profound effect on Islamist groups since Qutb. It contributed to conceptualizing the application of the concept in a series of polemic publications, including Jahiliyyat al Qarn al 'ishriin (The Disbelief of the Twentieth Century) and Waq'i'una al-Mu'asar (Our Present Reality). Muhammad Qutb's Jahiliyyat al Qarn al 'ishriin is ... fundamental for understanding the idea of tamkeen, as it argues about the modern political and societal decline that makes it necessary and plausible.* إن ماشرلا رارحاً مل ي ف (Film on Ahrar al Sham), *Al Jazeera, 3 March 2016* at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lydv7dr6qE&feature=youtu.be> members of that group talk interestingly about this concept in the context of Syria. It is widespread.

140. Since the position of Muslim minorities in secular western democracies is entirely new, there is nothing authentic or traditional about it, of course. *Karaoui 2018* is good on this. For Qaradawi's views on the 'jurisprudence of minorities' (*fiqh al 'aqaaliyyat*) see particularly **110** and **324ff**. And for an in-depth treatment of the issue see *Uriya Shavit, Shari'a and Muslim Minorities: The wasati and salafi approaches to fiqh al-aqaaliyyat al Muslima, OUP 2015*.

141. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the conflict in Afghanistan, the Rushdie Affair and the Balkan wars were all major focal points for this narrative. *Vidino 2010* gives a good account of this process. There are also striking personal accounts from British and other Muslims – Islamists and non-Islamists – in the *BBC Radio 4 documentary, How Islam Got Political, 10 November 2005* at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/shared/spl/hi/programmes/analysis/transcripts/10_11_05.txt. One says, "What these HT (sc Hizb-ut-Tahrir) members taught me was that Islam is not a religion. It is an ideology, something that has a political, economic and social system and religion is just something within it, something personal between you and God and the personal code between you and God. So this sort of captivated me more than anything else that was happening in youth culture." In terms of victimhood and confrontation, the comments of the former radical, Ghayausuddin Siddiqui, are highly relevant: "I think political Islam – the road it has put us on is a road to destruction. I think today, as a result of this approach, we are against everybody. We simply cannot afford to have the whole world against us. We have to have friends. Every project, idea we have is based on some kind of a confrontation and I think the time has come that Muslims wake up and challenge these dangerous ideas."

is why in Germany, which has the advantage of a Constitution setting out clearly the requirements of citizenship, the domestic intelligence agency, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), has no hesitation in describing even peaceful Islamists and Islamist movements as “Verfassungsfeindlich” (“inimical to the Constitution”).¹⁴² The Dutch and Austrian governments have taken a similar position. They routinely identify the Muslim Brotherhood and its various offshoots as damaging to social cohesion and the workings of a liberal society.¹⁴³ That in itself should give us pause.

How should we respond to all this?

First of all, we should resist the temptation to seek to understand Islamists through our own cultural or epistemological categories. There is a tendency to think of them as a version of the Christian Democrats where the men have beards, the women are veiled and they pray 5 times a day. Long-time Islamist activists like the Tunisian, Rachid al-Ghannouchi who announced in 2016 that his political party, Ennahda, was leaving the fold of Islamism and should instead be seen as a body of ‘Muslim Democrats’, certainly understand the utility of the analogy.¹⁴⁴ But it is misguided. There are undoubtedly many varieties of Islamism. And there have been reformists within movements like the MB who want more openness and plurality. But true reformists tend to leave.¹⁴⁵

It is also true strictly speaking that in orthodox Islamic jurisprudence the properly constituted politico-religious community is the caravan of salvation and therefore the only legitimate Islamic polity. But this reflects what Aziz al-Azmeh (again) describes as the utopian element in Islamic political thought, which in practice Muslim rulers have invariably sought to reconcile with the more urgent needs of the profane present.¹⁴⁶ In the actual practice of Muslim-ruled states the conduct of politics has generally been autonomous. The ruler and the scholar occupy distinct spheres. The latter checks the former’s exercise of power; the former controls affairs of state.¹⁴⁷

Islamism on the other hand seeks to transcend politics through reliance on divine revelation.¹⁴⁸ Its adherents typically place little emphasis on the tolerance, choice and individual freedoms, which most in the West claim to value. Ultimately, for Islamism, it is the interpretation of Shari’ah that sets the limits of liberty.¹⁴⁹ It does not regard democratic electoral choice as the fundamental expression of a political community. It rejects what we consider to be the self-evident legal equality of individuals regardless of gender or religion. As an ideology, it

142. For the whole debate in Germany – of considerable interest in this context – see *Vidino 2010, 155 ff.* For the expression see for example the latest BfV report for 2019 at <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/vsbericht-2019.pdf>. This echoes a consistent theme in all previous reports on the subject.

143. See for example *Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, From dawa to jihad: The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order, December 2004* at <https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/dawa.pdf> and my article *A Lesson from Vienna on Countering Islamist Extremism, Policy Exchange, 17 July 2020* at <https://policyexchange.org.uk/a-lesson-from-vienna-in-countering-islamist-extremism/>.

144. ‘*Tunisia’s Nahda party ditches Islamist tag*’, *The Financial Times, 22 May 2016*.

145. *Vidino 2020* has vivid and illuminating testimony from some of those who did.

146. In the tenth century, drawing heavily on Plato and Aristotle, the philosopher Al-Farabi described an ideal rational state in his treatise, *al Madinat al Fadhilah (The Virtuous State)*. Slightly later the Abbasid jurist, Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi, in the second chapter of his *Al Ahkam al Sultaniyya (The Laws of Islamic Governance)*, accepted that the Caliph, within the framework of a religiously legitimate state, may delegate either limited or – in cases of necessity – absolute political power to a temporal administrator. And in fourteenth century North Africa the great Arab historian, Ibn Khaldun, distinguished between *khilafah (caliphal authority)* as an ideal religio-political position and the admittedly inferior *mulk (kingly power)*. He accepted the latter as something potentially profane – underpinned by the practice of *al-siyasah al-aqliyya (rational politics)* or *qawanin al-siyasah (political rules)* rather than *Shari’ah*. He discusses the distinction between the ideal and the actual, its causes and consequences in the third chapter of the *First Book of the Muqaddimah*. See *Crone 2004* and *Azmeh 1997* and *2009* for a discussion of these texts, the issues that arise from them and the historical context. *Hefner 2011* and *Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam, Routledge 2007, 10ff* also address the issues.

147. For a usefully detailed examination of the absolutist claims of the Islamic State and other jihadi-salafi actors in the context of classical and modernising Islamic jurisprudence see *Arnold Yasin Mol, Denouncing Terrorism in the West: English Publications of Anti-terrorism Fatwa’s as Western Islamic Discourse with an analysis of the ‘Open Letter to Baghdadi’*, *Leiden 2019* at https://www.academia.edu/30084548/Commentary_on_the_Open_Letter_to_Baghdadi_upcoming.

148. See *Lahoud 2005, 7*, in reference to the work on Islamic intellectual currents of the Syrian modernist poet and critic, Adonis (Ali Ahmad Said), “*Time, then, is subservient to revelation. Accordingly, what pertains to religion comes to be above time and consequently above history.*”

149. As Islamists themselves openly assert, themselves openly assert. See *The Cordoba Foundation 2013, 21*: “*Since the Qur’an is the true and literal word of God, and the Hadith is the word of God through the teachings of his Prophet Muhammad, then salvation and justice could only be achieved by the adherence to the two main sources of the Shari’a. A return to the principles or the spirit of Islam is imperative – but without abandoning the principles and trappings of modern civilisation, providing it does not contradict the Shari’a. The spirit of the Shari’a is paramount, and since the preservation of life, religion, kinfolk, justice and wealth are the main objectives, then any man-made system, law, idea or invention is regarded as consistent with Islam as long as it does not contradict Shari’a itself.*”

is constitutively anti-Semitic¹⁵⁰ and homophobic; its approach to education and societal cohesion is unlikely to promote inclusivity;¹⁵¹ it seeks power first; and as we have seen in Sudan, Iran and Egypt in 2012 and 2013, its

150. As regularly noted by the BfV, most recently in their detailed publication, *Antisemitismus im Islamismus*, March 2019 at <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/pb-islamismus/broschuere-2019-03-antisemitismus-im-islamismus> but also in their annual reports, for example: "Antisemitismus ist ein konstitutives Elementin der Ideologie des gesamten islamistischen Spektrums. Religiöse, territoriale und/oder national-politische Motive verschmelzen dabei zu einem antisemitischen Weltbild, dessen wesentlicher Pfeiler eine angenommene ...jüdische Weltverschwörung" darstellt. Dabei werden Juden als Drahtzieher einer weltweiten Verschwörung gesehen und kollektiv für verschiedene Übel und Missstände verantwortlich gemacht. Aber auch außerhalb islamistischer Zusammenhänge ist Antisemitismus in einigen Heimatländern von muslimischen Migranten verbreitet und anschlussfähig.", *Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2017*, 171 and 194 at <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/vsbericht-2017.pdf>. See also Jeffrey Herf, *Not in Moderation*, (a review of Gilbert Achcar's *The Arabs and the Holocaust*), *New Republic*, 1 November 2010 at <https://newrepublic.com/article/78714/not-in-moderation>; Rawan Osman, *New Forms of Old Hate: Confronting Assad's Anti-Semitism in Germany*, *The Washington Institute*, 6 February 2020 at <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/new-forms-of-old-hate-confronting-assads-anti-semitism-in-germany>; B. Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) and the same author's *Semites and Anti-Semites*, (New York: Norton, 1986). A. Al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928-1947* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998) is sympathetic to the MB and their aims but clear about the way they elided the distinction between Judaism and Zionism and based their hostility to Jews on a particular reading of the Qur'an and Hadith. This is supported by the interesting comparative study by Milo Comerford and Rachel Bryson, *Struggle Over Scripture: Charting the Rift Between Islamist Extremism and Mainstream Islam* (The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2017), https://institute.global/sites/default/files/inline-files/TBI_Struggle-over-Scripture_0.pdf. This found that Islamists and Salafi-Jihadis devote a disproportionate amount of time in their Quranic commentaries (*tafaseer*) to the issue of Judaism and Jews. For a good recent example of this, see A. Jawad Al-Tamimi, *Jaysh al-Ummah in Gaza: Exclusive Interview*, *Pundicity*, 20 February 2019 at <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/02/jaysh-al-ummah-in-gaza-exclusive-interview>.

151. Mariz Tadros, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt*, Routledge 2012 is – among other things – a useful survey of the MB's social attitudes.

understanding of how to run modern states is fatally flawed.¹⁵²

Certainly, the core tenets of Islamism run against not only classical Islamic understandings of politics and power but also their contemporary western equivalents. Taken as a whole, when combined with unstable electoral systems and fractured societies, this is always likely to produce – at best – what Fareed Zakaria, Shadi Hamid and others have called “illiberal democracy” and culturally and socially coercive states.¹⁵³

152. Israelis understandably emphasise the MB's anti-Semitism. But it is not a delusion, as a glance at Hamas's Charter or the documents – including wiretap transcripts – from the Holy Land Foundation trial in the US in 2004 will amply demonstrate: see **Vidino 2010, 178ff**. **Prazan 2013** shows some startling filmed examples of Hamas hate-speech. **Prazan 2014, 3887ff** quotes Mahmoud Ghozlan, the EMB's spokesman, praising Roger Garaudy, the French Holocaust denier. See also **Prazan 2014, 3055ff** and **3715ff** for more on this and the MB's general equivocations. It is common for MB members to deny the Holocaust, quote the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and claim that Jews were responsible for 9/11, as I once heard Abdullah Shamiah, the NTC's Minister of the Economy and a Brother, do in front of an international audience in Benghazi in 2011 and as several Jordanian Brothers said to me in 2014. Hamas' Charter “traffics in virtually every trope of classic European anti-semitism” **Euben and Zaman 2009, 362**. This is structural, part of a worldview based in Islamic historiography (and not only Islamic, of course), with Jews as the eternal Other, as **Saïd Ben Saïd** : « *L'antisémitisme des Arabes aujourd'hui est le même que le vieil antisémitisme européen* », **Le Monde 6 November 2017** at http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/11/06/said-ben-said-l-antisemitisme-des-arabes-aujourd-hui-est-le-meme-que-le-vieil-antisemitisme-europeen_5210836_3232.html?xtmc=said_ben_said&xtcr=1 has argued. For Hamas and the MB in general Palestine is a microcosm of the Islamist struggle and the textbook example of defensive jihad. In Jordan, the former parliamentary Speaker, Dr Abdellatif al-Arabiati, the senior Brotherhood figure in the country, once told me that Al-Qaeda was a creation of the US. This intense conspiracy-mindedness also seems to be a structural feature of the MB's foundational narrative (on which **Kandil 2015, Chapters 2-5** is good). There is an excellent piece about the managerialism, ideological rigidity, illiberalism and consequent political aporia of the contemporary MB, particularly but not exclusively in Europe, that can lead to the disillusion and departure of reformists, independent thinkers and indeed harder line Islamists by **Samir Amghar & Fall Khadiyatoulah, Disillusioned Militancy: the Crisis of Militancy and Variables of Disengagement of the European Muslim Brotherhood, Mediterranean Politics, 3 November 2016** at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629395.2016.1230941>. **Jane Kinninmont, Moving Target: UK-GCC Relations and the Politics of 'Extremism', Chatham House, September 2016** at

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-09-14-moving-target-extremism-kinninmont-final-2.pdf> provides a useful summary of the issues for the UK. It has also become a wider concern: see for example the interesting studies produced by **Universität Wien, Institut für Islamischen Studien** at <https://iis.univie.ac.at/forschung/laufende-projekte/> (contested but not discredited by Austrian Islamists) and **Lorenzo Vidino, The Muslim Brotherhood in Austria, George Washington University and the University of Vienna, August 2017** at

<https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/MB%20in%20Austria-%20Print.pdf>. Note the comments of **Marc Lynch, Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong?, POMEPS, 3 February 2014** at <http://pomeps.org/2014/02/03/did-we-get-the-muslim-brotherhood-wrong/>. “The Brotherhood's commitment to democratic procedures never really translated into a commitment to democratic or liberal norms. It always struggled with the obvious tension between its commitment to Shari'ah and its participation in democratic elections” and those of **Roel Meijer, Islamist Movements and the Political After the Arab Uprisings, POMEPS, 24 January 2014** at

<http://pomeps.org/2014/02/04/islamist-movements-and-the-political-after-the-arab-uprisings/>. **Berman 2003, 266** had already noted in the Egyptian context that “...there is no reason to believe that civil society activity will have democratic, liberal or even particularly laudable results”. Interestingly she compares the Egyptian experience of a hollowed-out state faced by “extremist movements ... supported by a vibrant associational infrastructure” with that of Weimar Germany. For an account of traditional Shari'ah approaches to homosexuality and indeed wider issues of lifestyle and political pluralism, see **Brown 2016**: his arguments are not entirely persuasive but he draws an interesting distinction between this and harder-line Islamists. The EMB in power in Egypt welcomed the participation of women politically but that was strictly defined as subordinate to men and they remain ideologically opposed to gender equality, as the text of the constitution and their reactionary contribution to discussions of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in March 2013 made clear: see for example **Al Arabiya, Egypt's Brotherhood Slates “Un-Islamic” UN Declaration on Women's Rights, Al Arabiyya 16 March 2013** at <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/2013/03/16/Egypt-s-Brotherhood-slates-un-Islamic-U-N-declaration-on-women-rights.html>. They also refused to participate in the mass Egyptian demonstrations of December 2011 protesting at violence against women: **Juan Cole, The New Arabs, New York, 2014, 203**. It wasn't just them: “Members of al Islah [the Yemeni MB] rapidly appeared as the dominant force of such committees and imposed part of their agenda. On Change Square in Sanaa, a clear sign of the shift within the revolutionary realm became the shrinking space granted to women: gender separation during the demonstrations was gradually imposed by the organizing committee in which Muslim Brothers were over-represented. Some female activists who were opposing gender separation or were known for their liberal stance were even beaten up”: **Laurent Bonnefoy, The Islah Party in post-Salih Yemen, unpublished paper from LSE Conference on The Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Spring, 9-11 September 2013**. There were similar assaults – to which I was witness – in Tahrir Square in Benghazi in September 2011. This is not to deny that women can be effective and even at times strong participants in Islamist movements. But it is always within strict boundaries: see for example **Janine di Giovanni, Enter the Muslim Sisterhood, Newsweek, 19 December 2013** at <http://www.newsweek.com/enter-muslim-sisterhood-244958> and

Roula Khalaf, The Muslim Sisterhood, Financial Times, 2 November 2012 at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/167164a6-1e34-11e2-8e1d-00144feabdc0.html>. The Syrian MB claims to be pluralist and democratic. It articulated its vision for the post-Assad future in 2012: see **Syria Resources, Building the Syrian State: A Plan by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Carnegie, 17 January 2013** at <http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=50663>. But it has also said “appropriate values must be put in place to ensure that men and women continue to fulfil the mutually complementary roles God has assigned to them.” **Lefèvre 2013, 172**. There are some interesting reflections on what would need to happen for all this to change in **Omayma Abdel-Latif, In the Shadow of the Brothers, Carnegie, October 2008** at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/women_egypt_muslim_brotherhood.pdf. It has not happened inside Hamas. **Tarek Masoud, Rethinking Political Islam? Think Again, POMEPS, 24 January 2014** at

<http://pomeps.org/2014/02/05/rethinking-political-islam-think-again/> remarks, “The brief experience of Islamism in power has given us precious little reason to revise the view of Islamists as fundamentally illiberal.” He goes on to suggest that this is not simply because they are Islamists but something in the Egyptian political system. But we see the same phenomena in Sudan, Iran and Turkey. And for examples from the UK see **Perry 2020, 17ff**. **Vidino 2010** has numerous examples of similar features from other MB branches and associates. **Tharwat al Khirbawi, Sirr al Ma'bad (Secret of the Temple), 2012** records a respected Shaikh mocking the MB by saying that for them, “Islam is the solution: Muslims are the problem”: see **Kandil 2015, 3294**. **El-Sherif 2014** talks about “intolerant, divisive and hate-based religious politics Islamists' sectarian hate speech, threats against freedom and secular lifestyles...The Islamist ideology effectively discriminated against women, non-Muslims and anyone who was not an Islamist... it eschewed liberal values of pluralism, tolerance, and respect for individual freedoms in favour of theocratic intolerant notions of communal discipline and authoritative control”. **Christine Schirmacher, “Let there be no compulsion in Religion”: Apostasy from Islam as judged by contemporary Islamic Theologians, Bonn 2016**

has numerous detailed examples from Qaradawi and Mawdudi of what Islamist intolerance looks like in practice.

153. See **Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power, Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East, OUP 2014 (Kindle Edition)**. When Yusuf Nada, in the remarkable **Mansour 2014** talks of Arab monarchies and military governments (including Egypt's) as “idolatry” and their citizens as “slaves” he is essentially saying they are un-Islamic and therefore illegitimate. This is not simply an Islamic version of Christian Socialism, Moral Rearmament or R H Tawney's notion in the 1920s of a newly re-moralised social order in Britain. Its nearest European analogue may be in the providential and socially interventionist Calvinism of the late C16th and C17th that led to the Rule of the Saints in Geneva, the Anabaptists of Münster and in England to that “surveillance society of the soul”, the Rule of the Major-Generals between 1655 and 1659: **Paul Lay, Paradise Lost: The Rise and Fall of Cromwell's Protectorate, London 2020 (Kindle Edition)**. It may be fantasy: but it continues to have a powerful appeal. For a liberal critique of all anti-western metaphysical and totalising ideologies see **Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism, London 2004**, a companion piece to **Robert Irwin's, For Lust of Knowing: Orientalism and its Enemies, Allen Lane, 2006**.

This is not simply a historically contingent anomaly which can be removed by exposure to even more liberalism. Islamism – to which the Brotherhood is central – constitutes a profound ideological challenge to the modern western conception of the state and its foundational principles. And that same Islamism continues to threaten the constitutive basis of contemporary Muslim majority states, the embedded historical practice they reflect and the state systems within which they operate.

Naming Names

It is for these reasons, then, that it is important to name such phenomena carefully, honestly and openly. To do so is not some sort of malign Orientalist reflex. It is not to stigmatise Islam as a religion or a civilisation, as Islamist apologists tendentiously would have us believe: quite the contrary. Nor is it an underhand means of ignoring or suppressing justified criticism of discriminatory practices. It is rather to draw a fundamental distinction between *Islam* as a lived faith in a complex world, and *Islamism* as an epistemically impoverished, but dynamic ideology.¹⁵⁴

It is important to recognise that the ideology which inspires Islamists is derived from authentically Islamic sources and reflects certain Islamic teachings. It is also important to understand that the methods by which these sources are selected and interpreted are heterodox¹⁵⁵ – and that Islamists use them to construct political meaning and drive activism in innovative and highly irregular ways.¹⁵⁶ As a result of this, they are routinely challenged by more traditional sources of authority in the Muslim world. In Indonesia, for example, the Nahdlatul Ulama, perhaps the world's largest Muslim organisation, has for decades been a fierce critic of the local Islamist movement.¹⁵⁷ So have many senior religious scholars in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Nevertheless, the way in which Islamists appear to offer certainty in an unstable world, continues to bring them success. Around the world, they have proven far more successful than their less absolutist rivals in injecting Islamist discourse into the public space¹⁵⁸ – particularly in western societies where governments tend to keep their distance from issues of religion.

To challenge this phenomenon it is essential to be able to identify it. That is why the use of the term 'Islamism' and its cognates in reference to the trends I have described is now standard international practice, including among Arab and Muslim scholars writing in English or other European languages.¹⁵⁹ In Arabic they will use a similarly specialised vocabulary to identify particular groups within an Islamic frame of reference.¹⁶⁰ Arab Islamists will do the same – sometimes in order to distinguish themselves from others whose views they reject. But they will often simply use terms that suggest they see themselves not as dissidents but in fact as the only properly authentic Muslims.¹⁶¹ The Islamic State called itself that for a purpose: to assert a claim to be the only Islamically legitimate political community on earth.¹⁶² And this points to a central problem in any effort to remove the term 'Islamist' from the political lexicon in the UK or elsewhere. The real alternative is not some

154. On this point see for example *Lahoud 2005, 20ff*.

155. Islamic jurisprudence and exegesis have generally agreed rules, though they may differ between different canonical schools of thought.

156. There is a good discussion of how this works by *The Change Institute, Studies into violent radicalisation: The beliefs, ideologies and narratives, The European Commission, February 2008* at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_ideology_and_narrative_en.pdf

157. *J. M. Dorsey, Indonesia: A Major Prize in the Battle for the Soul of Islam, Besa Center, 2 September 2020*, <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/indonesia-islam/>

158. See the *French Sénat Rapport 2020, 60ff* and *Karoui 2018, Part III* for an account of this phenomenon in France and elsewhere in Europe. The analysis applies in the UK.

159. A few examples: *Ayubi, Devji, Euben, Mandaville, Volpi, Tammam, Kepel, Roy, Lacroix, Hegghammer all op cit*. For the use of "political Islam/Islamist" by Islamists themselves see for example the various articles in *The Cordoba Foundation 2013*.

160. For example, "*al islamiyyuun, al islam al siyasi* (the name of a well-known book on the subject by Muhammad Sa'id Ashmawi), *al madd al islami, al sahw al islamiyyah* (the name of the wave of Islamist revivalism, a combination of MB activism and Salafi doctrine, that swept the Gulf and then the wider Middle East from the late 1970s onwards), *al harakat al islamiyyah, al tataruff al islami, al salafiyah al 'ilmiyyah/al madkhaliyyah/al jihadiyyah/al harakiyyah, al da'wah al islamiyyah* and so forth. A more recent coinage is "*al islamawiyah*", which continues to draw a distinction between the ideological current and the religion while clearly acknowledging the connection. A good discussion of this terminology is *Hadi Salem Mashour (رؤوس م لاس يذاه), Al Islamawiyah is not from Islam (أم الإسلام ذم تسيل « ذيم الإسلام)*, *Al Bayan, 21 February 2019* at <https://www.albayan.ae/opinions/articles/2019-02-21-1.3493677>.

161. Hassan al-Banna named his movement 'The Society of Muslim Brothers'. After his death *Mitchell 1993* reports that his successors considered but rejected "*al nahdhat al islamiyyah*" (*Islamic Renaissance*), which in turn would inspire the renaming of the affiliated movement in Tunisia under Rachid al-Ghannouchi. In Kuwait the main Islamist movement is known as the *Islamic Constitutional Movement ('al harakat al dustouriyah al islamiyyah' - « ذيم الإسلام ذم تسيل »)*, in Jordan as '*the Islamic Action Front*'. *Hamas* is the Arabic acronym for '*The Islamic Resistance Movement*'.

162. The Arabic acronym, Da'esh, which has a disobliging sound because of its resemblance to other words in Arabic meaning '*tread/stamp on, run over*' or '*monstrous/obscene*', still contains the word 'Islamic' encoded at its heart.

fatuous bromide like ‘faith-based violence’ (which begs the question: which faith?¹⁶³ Are we really supposed to be unable to guess?) or ‘irhabi’ (why Arabic rather than, say, Serbo-Croat or Inuit?). If we take Islamists at their own estimation, then we should simply use the terms ‘Islamic’ and ‘Muslim’. That would be the real injustice.

And that is why the terms ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamist’ are so important. They point – uncomfortably perhaps – to the reality that Islamists claim not just to be Muslims but to be better Muslims than others. Simultaneously, the use of such terms reminds us that Islamism is not Islam.¹⁶⁴

These are the critical first principles upon which any serious response to Islamism must be based. Without clarity of language there can be no clarity of policy. Semantic parlour games help no-one. At best they are a distraction; at worst they risk obscuring or distorting the nature of the phenomenon that we face. As described here, that phenomenon has a name established in academic and popular understandings – Islamism. We must not be afraid to use it.¹⁶⁵

163. On this question see **Cook 2014**. In spite of the special pleading of Islamists and their apologists, there is no Christian, Jewish or Hindu equivalent to transnational Islamism. Where is the Catholic Da'esh, the Lutheran AQ, the Orthodox mujahideen, the Old Believer PIJ, the Maronite Jal, the Wee Free Hezbollah? PIRA didn't shoot, bomb, torture, kneecap and extort because they wanted the Pope to rule the world, believed in imposing a belief in transubstantiation on recalcitrant Calvinists or thought we should all be more Thomist. They did so because they were violent republicans and mythographic nationalists who'd read Lenin. And the Catholic Church consistently condemned its acts of terror. Sinn Fein remains a left-wing Irish nationalist movement, no less so now, when Catholicism has lost its traction in the Republic of Ireland, than when a majority of the population went to Mass every Sunday. When Jewish militants in the 1980s conducted a campaign of violence against Palestinian mayors, Shin Bet called them the Jewish not the Faith-Based Underground. The same applies to Hindutva extremists in India.

164. Something Islamists seek to obscure. See **Lahoud 2005, Chapter 1**.

165. Or, as **Karoui 2018** writes, "*L'idéologie islamiste fait peur. Mais ce n'est pas la peur qui doit nous guider, c'est la raison. C'est en comprenant les rouages de la machine islamiste que nous pourrions apporter une réponse au défi qui nous est adressé L'Europe doit s'emparer de la question de l'islam, sans passion ni haine mais avec exigence et raison : c'est l'intérêt des musulmans d'Europe qui doivent échapper à l'emprise des pays d'origine et à l'emprise islamiste, c'est l'intérêt aussi de l'Europe tant la question de l'islam et la peur que cette religion suscite est devenue commune et centrale dans le débat politique continental.*"



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